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Beyond War: Bin Laden, Escobar, and
the Justification of Targeted Killing
Luis E. Chiesa*
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt∗∗
Abstract
Using the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden as a case
study, this Article contributes to the debate on targeted killing in
two distinct ways, each of which has the result of downplaying the
centrality of international humanitarian law (IHL) as the decisive
source of justification for targeted killings.
First, we argue that the IHL rules governing the killing of
combatants in wartime should be understood to apply more
strictly in cases involving the targeting of single individuals,
particularly when the targeting occurs against nonparadigmatic
combatants outside the traditional battlefield. As applied to the
bin Laden killing, we argue that the best interpretation of IHL
would have required the SEALs to capture bin Laden in
conditions short of surrender, if he was in fact manifestly
defenseless or otherwise could have been readily captured with
little risk.
Second, we take seriously the possibility that the law should
tolerate some targeted killings under conditions that are justified
neither by reference to IHL nor by reference to the traditional
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authors are also grateful to Joanna Meyer and the editors of the Washington
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publication.
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justifications available in peacetime. Drawing upon the example
of Colombian crime family leader Pablo Escobar, who died in a
police raid in 1993 in circumstances suggesting the authorities
were not interested in capture, we suggest that targeted killings in
these circumstances may be morally—if not legally—justified
when (1) killing the targeted individual will protect society from a
serious threat, (2) the individual is undeniably culpable for past
atrocities, and (3) trying the individual is either logistically
impossible or extraordinarily dangerous.
Although we conclude that the bin Laden killing does not
clearly satisfy the third criterion, this model nevertheless
provides—in important ways—a superior framework for
understanding public responses to bin Laden’s death than does
the war paradigm.
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I. Introduction
On the evening of Sunday, May 1, 2011, President Barack
Obama appeared on television to announce that a United States
operation had killed Osama bin Laden following a raid upon the
al Qaeda leader’s secret home in Abbottabad, Pakistan.1 In the
United States, the news that the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks
had finally been taken down after a decade of false leads and
1. See President Barack Obama, Osama Bin Laden Dead, THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (May 2, 2011, 11:35 p.m.), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (transcribing
President Obama’s address) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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intelligence failures was met, understandably, with widespread
jubilation, and crowds gathered in New York City and
Washington, D.C., to celebrate the event.2 As the New York Times
reported the following morning, “Bin Laden’s demise is a defining
moment in the American-led fight against terrorism, a symbolic
stroke affirming the relentlessness of the pursuit of those who
attacked New York and Washington on Sept. 11, 2001.”3
News reports in subsequent days and weeks revealed
additional details of the suspenseful operation against bin Laden:
A Navy SEAL team flew clandestinely by helicopter deep into
Pakistan and undertook its mission by cover of night in a
sprawling compound.4 Analysts debated the significance of the
killing for future anti-terrorism efforts and the implications for
the United States’ relationship with Pakistan, given the startling
revelation that bin Laden was not hiding in the remote tribal
areas of the Northwest, where Pakistan has struggled to
establish control, but in an affluent suburb only thirty miles
outside Islamabad.5
Comparatively little public attention, at least inside the
United States, has focused on the killing’s legality.6 Was the
2. See Peter Baker et al., Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2011, at A1 (describing the American public’s reaction to President
Obama’s announcement of bin Laden’s death). For a more detailed summary of
existing reports of the operation, see Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama
Bin Laden & Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory, 14 Y.B. INT’L
HUMANITARIAN L. 255, 258–60 (2012).
3. Id.
4. See How the Raid Unfolded, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/02/world/asia/abbottabad-map-ofwhere-osama-bin-laden-was-killed.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Osama Bin Laden’s Death: How It
Happened, BBC, (June 7, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia13257330 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2011, at
34, 35 (providing a detailed account of the mission and its planning).
5. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 36 (describing American efforts to locate
bin Laden in Pakistan since 2001 and stating “it remains unclear how [bin
Laden] ended up living in Abbottabad”).
6. Although some members of the human rights community voiced
objections, the raid sparked substantially more public criticism abroad. See
WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, JUSTICE AND THE ENEMY: NUREMBERG, 9/11, AND THE TRIAL
OF KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED 194–200 (2011) (discussing international human
rights organizations’ reactions to the bin Laden killing).
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killing an exercise of individual self-defense on the part of Navy
SEALs? Or were U.S. forces operating under more permissive
rules of engagement that did not require bin Laden to pose an
immediate threat? In his speech to the nation, the President did
not address these questions explicitly. To the extent his remarks
provided an answer, they gave mixed signals.7 On the one hand,
President Obama emphasized the gravity of the al Qaeda leader’s
criminality and appeared to portray the mission as an exercise in
criminal justice. Bin Laden was “the leader of al Qaeda, and a
terrorist who’s responsible for the murder of thousands of
innocent men, women, and children.”8 The operation the
President authorized was one “to get bin Laden and bring him to
justice,” and by his killing, the President could “say to those
families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has
been done.”9 The President struck a similar chord in a television
interview the following week, in which he explained that “the one
thing I didn’t lose sleep over was the possibility of taking bin
Laden out. Justice was done. And I think that anyone who would
question that the perpetrator of mass murder on American soil
didn’t deserve what he got needs to have their head examined.”10
Few could doubt the President’s assessment of bin Laden’s
individual desert, but desert alone does not supply a justification
for killing. The law, after all, generally does not authorize lawenforcement officials to kill dangerous criminals in lieu of a
criminal trial conducted in accordance with due process of law.11
7. See Obama, supra note 1 (recounting bin Laden’s role in the 9/11
attacks, efforts to track bin Laden, and Obama’s order “to get Osama bin Laden
and bring him to justice” but not addressing any legal grounds supporting the
killing).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Killing Bin Laden: The President’s Story, 60 MINUTES (CBS television
broadcast May 8, 2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=
7365396n&tag=mncol;lst;10.
11. In U.S. law, this prohibition finds expression in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV
(codifying due process rights). At the international level, equivalent protections
are found in major human rights treaties among other sources. See NILS
MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–139 (2008) (analyzing
protections found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and the European Convention
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Accordingly, killing by law-enforcement officials is generally only
permitted on urgent preventive grounds, to deflect an imminent
lethal threat to self or others, or to prevent a dangerous suspect’s
escape.12
In his speech, the President also indicated a separate
consideration that has significant legal implications: the United
States was at “war against al Qaeda to protect our citizens, our
friends, and our allies.”13 Although the discourse of war received
only passing mention in this context, it assumed prominence in
later days as administration officials more explicitly addressed
the legality of the bin Laden killing. In a May 19, 2011 blog post
on the international law blog Opinio Juris, State Department
Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh relied exclusively on the law
regulating the conduct of war—the “law of war” in U.S. legal
terminology, or international humanitarian law (IHL) in the
terminology of international law—to justify the operation against
bin Laden.14 He noted that, following 9/11, Congress authorized
the use of force against al Qaeda, and he referred to the current
existence of an “armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and
associated forces.”15 Pursuant to the applicable rules of war,
argued Koh, U.S. forces were permitted to kill bin Laden as an
enemy combatant without prior due process because he had not
affirmatively provided a “genuine offer of surrender that [was]
clearly communicated . . . and received by the opposing force,

for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), along
with relevant authority).
12. See infra Part III (discussing permissive killings); MELZER, supra note
11, at 232 (providing the circumstances, based on a review of international legal
sources, in which lethal force may be used). Melzer concludes that “[a]s a
general rule, potentially lethal force should not be used except to: (1) defend any
person against an imminent threat of death or serious injury, (2) prevent the
perpetration of particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, or
(3) arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting arrest, or to prevent
his or her escape.” Id.
13. Obama, supra note 1.
14. Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against
Osama bin Laden, OPINIO JURIS (May 19, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://opinionjuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operation-against-osamabin-laden/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (setting forth grounds for the legality of
bin Laden’s killing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. Id.
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under circumstances where it [was] feasible for the opposing force
to accept that offer of surrender.”16
The invocation of the more permissive approach to killing
applicable in wartime raises its own set of questions, concerning
whether the war paradigm applies and which rules of
engagement this body of law permits. The tension revealed in
Obama’s speech—between bin Laden as a criminal suspect and
bin Laden as an enemy combatant—is emblematic of the broader
difficulties raised in recent years by the practice of targeted
killing as a component of the United States’ efforts to combat al
Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, and by
Israel’s counterterrorism efforts in the West Bank and Gaza.17
16. Id. Subsequent statements by U.S. government officials have expanded
upon the legal basis of U.S. targeted-killing policy without impacting this aspect
of the basis for the bin Laden killing. See, e.g., Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen.,
Address at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html
(last
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (maintaining that the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen
terrorist is lawful if: “. . . the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack
against the United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the operation
would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John O. Brennan, Assistant to
the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of
the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Remarks to the Wilson Center (Sept.
6, 2012), available at http://www.wilson center.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethicsus-counterterrorism-strategy (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (stating that certain
“targeted strikes are legal,” ethical, and wise under international and U.S. law
and policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jeh Charles
Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., National Security Law, Lawyers and
Lawyering in the Obama Administration, Address at Yale Law School (Feb. 22,
2012), available at http://ylsmediaserv.law.yale.edu/netcasts/2012/YLSThomas
Johnson022212.mp3 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (summarizing “some of the basic
legal principles that form the basis for the U.S. military's counterterrorism efforts
against Al Qaeda and its associated forces”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
17. Recent academic literature addressing these issues is substantial. For
selected works of particular relevance to this Article, see generally TARGETED
KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD (Claire Finkelstein,
Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012); MELZER, supra note 11;
Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 145 (2010); Michael L. Gross, Assassination and Targeted Killing:
Law Enforcement, Execution or Self-Defence?, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 323 (2006);
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE
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Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann have aptly summarized how
this emerging practice has tested the intuitions underlying the
traditional legal paradigms that regulate the conditions under
which governments may kill individuals as exercises of either law
enforcement or war powers:
A targeted killing entails an entire military operation that is
planned and executed against a particular, known person. In
war, there is no prohibition on the killing of a known enemy
combatant; for the most part, wars are fought between
anonymous soldiers, and bullets have no designated names on
them. The image of a powerful army launching a highly
sophisticated guided missile from a distance, often from a
Predator drone, against a specific individual driving an
unarmored vehicle or walking down the street starkly
illustrates the
difference
between counterinsurgency
operations and the traditional war paradigm. Moreover, the
fact that all targeted killing operations in combating terrorism
are directed against particular individuals makes the tactic
more reminiscent of a law enforcement paradigm, where power
is employed on the basis of individual guilt rather than status
(civilian/combatant). Unlike a law enforcement operation,
however, there are no due process guarantees: the individual
is not forewarned about the operation, is not given a chance to
defend his innocence, and there is no assessment of his guilt
by any impartial body.18

We do not attempt in this Article to resolve every problem
associated with targeted killing. Nor do we attempt a definitive
answer regarding the legality of bin Laden’s killing itself.
However, the circumstances surrounding bin Laden’s demise
bring into sharp focus the war paradigm’s limits as a justifying
framework for the evolving practice of targeted killing. In this
respect, this Article contributes to the debate on targeted killing
in two distinct ways, both of which have the result of
downplaying the war paradigm as the decisive justification for
targeted killing.

CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed.) (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense
Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2010); Daniel Statman, Targeted
Killing, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179 (2004); Van Schaack, supra note 2.
18. Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 147–48.

IN
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In Part II, we argue that IHL, assuming it applies, does not
play the decisive role in justifying targeted killing that is often
assumed.19 The problem here is twofold. First, there is
indeterminacy in IHL itself. It remains unclear how the
requirements of IHL—in particular, the overarching mandate
that killing pursue military necessity—apply to operations, such
as the bin Laden killing, whose functional requirements do not
resemble those traditionally associated with the battlefield, but
rather mirror those of traditional law-enforcement operations.20
Second, the problem of targeted killing exposes a deeper
uncertainty about the moral status of IHL. At its root, IHL is a
body of law that relaxes the deep-seated rule against murder.21
Its expanded permission to kill most plausibly reflects realism in
the face of the historical inevitability of war rather than a fully
developed moral justification for killing.22 Because of this feature
of IHL, the possibility that other law might similarly evolve to
accommodate expanded forms of killing outside the war paradigm
cannot be ruled out. However, it also urges deep caution with
respect to the interpretation and the application of IHL in
nonparadigmatic cases.
These considerations justify the intuition—reflected already,
to a degree, in both U.S. policy23 and Israeli judicial doctrine24—
that the rules governing killing should be stricter in cases
involving the targeted killing of single individuals, particularly
when the targeting occurs against nonparadigmatic combatants
outside the traditional battlefield. They also indicate that IHL’s
19. See infra Part II (discussing moral and legal justifications for targeted
killing in war).
20. See infra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties of applying traditional
criteria for targeting killing to the circumstances involving bin Laden).
21. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 74–81 (defining basic principles of IHL
and the legal framework it provides for justifying targeted killings).
22. See infra Part II.A (discussing how IHL’s justification for killing
illustrates the law’s adapting to real needs).
23. See, e.g., Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of
Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1 (outlining
President Obama’s stipulations for targeted killing).
24. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel
paras.
18–23
[2005]
(Isr.),
available
at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/
Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (recognizing the need to balance
humanitarian considerations against military need).
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generally expansive approach to killing is inappropriate in
operations that are not supported by functional requirements or
reasons that plausibly sound in military advantage.25
Although these considerations alone cannot tell us whether it
was permissible to kill bin Laden under the circumstances—
much depends on facts that may never be known—they do call
into question the breadth of the standard that the State
Department applied in justifying the killing. It is not enough, we
argue, to establish that bin Laden was a combatant engaged in
armed conflict against the United States who had not
affirmatively and clearly surrendered under conditions that
would have facilitated a safe capture. We argue that the best
interpretation of IHL required an attempt to capture bin Laden
absent surrender unless the decision to kill in lieu of capture was
justified by recourse to conventional understandings of military
advantage, was in fact motivated by the pursuit of military
advantage, and would have spared U.S. military personnel from
risks greater than those generally expected of law-enforcement
officials acting under like circumstances.26 Although it is correct,
as commentators have noted, that IHL does not impose any
general duty to capture non-surrendering combatants, the
requirements we identify are implied in other rules of IHL and,
more deeply, by the structure of IHL itself.27
The remainder of the Article takes seriously the possibility
that the law should tolerate some targeted killings under
conditions that are justified neither by reference to an armed
conflict nor by reference to the traditional parameters of the lawenforcement paradigm. Part III explores the limits of existing
legal categories rooted in self-defense, lesser-evils, and lawenforcement authority as frameworks for justifying targeted
killings.28 In Part IV, we identify what we believe to be one of the
25. See infra Part II.B (discussing the importance of military necessity to
justify targeted killing).
26. See infra Part V.D (laying out criteria to justify killing rather than
capture).
27. See infra Part II.B (arguing that IHL implicitly requires a duty of
capture in some cases).
28. See infra Part III (discussing legal grounds for targeted killing outside
of war, including defense of self or others, law enforcement, and a necessary or
lesser evil).
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most persuasive cases for justifying targeted killing beyond the
currently accepted paradigms: that of late Colombian crime
family leader Pablo Escobar, who died in a police raid in 1993 in
circumstances suggesting the authorities were not interested in
capture.29 As we explore in Part V, we are uncertain whether the
lessons of the Escobar killing can or should be reduced to a
judicially enforceable legal standard, but the intuition that
Colombian authorities would have acted justifiably in ordering
the killing is supported by three features that distinguish
Escobar from other criminal suspects.30 First, at the time of his
death, he remained a dangerous individual who posed
demonstrable dangers to Colombian society and was almost
certain to continue his involvement in serious crimes.31 Second,
he was unquestionably guilty of horrendous crimes that rank
among the worst of the late twentieth century.32 Third, his track
record—including the murder of incorruptible judges and his
prior escape from confinement—indicated that it was infeasible
and unacceptably dangerous to try him.33
Might these criteria that support the killing of Escobar
likewise justify the killing of Osama bin Laden? We think not. As
we explain in Part VI, although the bin Laden case mirrors
Escobar’s in the combination of grave, unquestionable guilt and
continuing danger, the obstacles to trial remain speculative and
lack the demonstrable urgency witnessed by the case of Escobar,
who, by the time of his death, had already established a track
record of corrupting and murdering the officials whom the legal
system relied on to bring him to justice.34 There is no parallel in
the case of bin Laden, and to justify his killing based on the more
generalized fear that a trial would bring security risks would
create a dangerous slippery slope.
29. See infra Part IV (discussing the killing of Pablo Escobar as well as
reactions to and justifications for the killing).
30. See infra Part V (analyzing what Escobar’s killing teaches about the
morality of targeted killing and its justifications).
31. See infra Part IV.A (describing Escobar’s threat to the justice system).
32. See infra Part IV.A (describing Escobar’s crimes).
33. Id.
34. See infra Part VI (comparing Escobar and bin Laden and considering
whether justifications for killing Escobar extend to bin Laden’s killing).
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Nevertheless, the Escobar precedent remains relevant to
the bin Laden killing. As a descriptive matter, we believe that
the Escobar precedent better explains the public reception of bin
Laden’s killing—if not the government’s actual motives—than
does a focus on wartime hostilities. In other words, the reason
why bin Laden’s killing occasioned so little debate in the United
States is that the public saw bin Laden much as the President
presented him in his May 1 speech: not simply or even primarily
as a military opponent, but as a dangerous and deeply culpable
criminal.35 As a normative matter, moreover, the Escobar
precedent arguably provides a superior—if ultimately
unsuccessful—argument for why, assuming bin Laden could
have been readily captured at minimal risk, it was nevertheless
appropriate to kill him. Finally, Escobar’s case is informative for
understanding the bin Laden killing as a precedent, one that
may point toward a developing law in action that justifies a
limited set of targeted killings based on considerations of
culpability and danger, rather than a connection to armed
conflict.
Although we are concerned about where this precedent
could lead and would sharply limit the evolving law to privilege
criminal trials whenever feasible, there is also value to speaking
honestly about the possible bases of government action. The
temptation to rely on IHL to justify targeted killings
understandably derives from the fact that this is the body of law
that makes it easiest to justify killing. But relying on IHL comes
with the risk that states will expansively interpret that body of
law so as to justify policies that have little basis in the values or
functional requirements that initially gave rise to IHL. If
governments are in fact looking to culpability considerations in
developing policies of targeted killing, then there is value to
considering the circumstances under which such policies might
be justified and to debating concrete cases pursuant to the
criteria that are likely of most relevance to decision makers.

35. See Obama, supra note 1 (“[B]in Laden has been al Qaeda’s leader and
symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends
and allies.”).
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II. Justifying Targeted Killing in War
When people debate the legality of targeted killings, they
usually have in mind one or more cases that they believe
represent core examples of the practice. A common case—call it
TK 1—takes place in the theater of war and invokes IHL36 to
justify the killing.37 As a general matter, the world’s legal
systems forbid the intentional killing of individuals except in
narrowly defined circumstances, such as when necessary to
prevent the imminent use of lethal force by a wrongdoer.38 But if
TK 1 cases are properly subject to IHL, the legal landscape
changes considerably. Pursuant to these war rules, the norm
against killing is remarkably relaxed. Provided that a number of
status-based requirements are met, combatants in armed
conflicts are permitted to use lethal force against their opponents
in ways that would otherwise violate the peacetime prohibition
against murder. When combatants aim to kill their opponents,
there is no requirement that those targeted pose an imminent
threat, or indeed pose any sort of direct threat beyond their
participation in the broader war effort.39 As Michael Walzer has
36. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 74–81 (defining basic principles of IHL
and the legal framework it provides for analyzing targeted killings).
37. See id. at 55–58 (discussing the application of IHL to justify targeted
killing in conflicts).
38. See infra Part III (addressing the scope of permissible killing in
peacetime).
39. See, e.g., Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 146 (“[T]he enemy
combatants belong to another identifiable party and are killed not because they
are guilty, but because they are potentially lethal agents of that hostile party.”).
The core international rules governing the conduct of hostilities are laid out in
the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. See Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (providing, inter alia, rules
governing the conduct of hostilities). Even for states such as the United States
and Israel, which have not ratified the treaty, these rules are generally
recognized to reflect requirements of customary international law. See Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
¶ 75 (July 8) (noting that “[t]he provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977
give expression and attest to the unity and complexity” of the “large number of
customary rules [that] have been developed by the practice of States”); id. ¶ 78
(summarizing “[t]he cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the
fabric of humanitarian law”); HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel
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put it, the law of war permits the killing of “naked soldiers,” those
who, for example, are eating their breakfast or are asleep in their
beds.40 The potential for combatants to be attacked derives from
the general danger posed by their status.41 So long as hostilities
persist, the potential to be killed terminates only upon a
combatant becoming incapacitated—or “hors de combat”—on
account of his falling into the power of an adverse party; his
clearly expressed surrender; or his being rendered unconscious or
“otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness” such that he is
“incapable of defending himself.”42
Civilians, by contrast, may not be targeted “unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities,”43 and the
intentional targeting of civilians is a war crime under
international law.44 Nor may belligerents employ weapons or
v. Gov’t of Israel ¶ 4 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/
02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (stating that Additional Protocol I “reflects the
norms of customary international law, which obligate Israel”); see, e.g., JEANMARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 72 (2005) (mentioning an Israel–Lebanon ceasefire
understanding relying on customary international law principles and outlining
rules of customary international law governing the conduct of hostilities).
40. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 138 (1977) (“The first principle of the war
convention is that, once war has begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any
time (unless they are wounded or captured).”); Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable
Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 69, 71 (2010) (noting that “[t]he existing
interpretation of the laws of war supports Walzer’s conclusion” that a soldier
stripped naked and swimming in the lake is a legitimate target during an armed
conflict); Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status Groups in International
Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW
CHALLENGES: SYMPOSIUM IN THE HONOUR OF KNUT IPSEN 144, 148 (Wolff
Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping eds., 2007) (“[O]rdinary
combatants . . . can be attacked (and killed) wherever they are, in and out of
uniform: even when they are not on active duty. There is no prohibition either of
opening fire on retreating troops (who have not surrendered) or of targeting
individual combatants.”).
41. See Blum, supra note 40, at 71 (stating that one’s liability to attack is
based on his or her status as a combatant).
42. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 41. Thus, IHL prohibits the
denial of quarter, including orders that there shall be no survivors. Id. art. 40;
see also MELZER, supra note 11, at 367–71 (discussing the IHL rule against
denial of quarter).
43. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(3).
44. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
8(2)(b)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (declaring that “[i]ntentionally
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means of warfare that are indiscriminate or that cause
unnecessary suffering.45 Even so, civilians are also subject to
reduced protection under the war rules. When combatants attack
military targets, they may do so knowing that their actions will
kill civilians, so long as the anticipated loss of civilian life is not
disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage.46
These rules apply equally to all sides in conflict, without
distinction based on whether the party invoking IHL is supported
by a just cause.47 Thus, the rules are the same even if the killers
are invaders engaged in an illegal aggressive conquest, and their
opponents have taken up arms justly because self-defense
requires it. In the case of international armed conflicts covered by
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, states are affirmatively
prohibited from criminally prosecuting as murderers those who
have complied with IHL’s requirements.48 No corresponding
directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” is a war crime).
45. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, arts. 35(2), 51(4).
46. See id. art. 51(5)(b) (stating that attacks should be considered
indiscriminate if it “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated”).
47. See id. pmbl. (applying this protocol “without any adverse distinction
based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by
or attributed to the Parties to the conflict”). Here as well, these rules are more
permissive than those generally enforced by the criminal law. A bank robber
who kills a police officer in self-defense may not justify the killing if the police
officer herself was justified in using lethal force against the robber under the
circumstances. See WALZER, supra note 40 at 127–28 (offering this hypothetical).
Yet precisely such a privilege attaches to those who, fighting an illegal war of
aggression, kill enemy combatants who fight a just war of self-defense. See id. at
128 (“The moral equality of the battlefield distinguishes combat from domestic
crime.”).
48. This immunity appears, among other places, in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Pursuant to Article 87,
“[p]risoners of war may not be sentenced by the military authorities and courts
of the Detaining Power to any penalties except those provided for in respect of
members of the armed forces of the said Power who have committed the same
acts.” Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 87,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention].
Article 99 in turn provides that “[n]o prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced
for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by
international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.” Id. art. 99.
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combatant privilege applies in the case of internal armed conflicts
(thus, governments may invoke their domestic laws to prosecute
rebels for their rebellion), but even here the Second Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions endorses “the broadest
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed
conflict.”49
In light of this extraordinary permission that IHL affords, it
is unsurprising that the legal debate over the United States’
targeted killing policy has focused predominantly on whether and
how this body of law applies.50 These are the rules that the
United States has invoked to justify its targeted killing policies in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, and as already noted, to
justify the specific targeting of bin Laden.51 Similarly, Israel’s
Supreme Court invoked IHL when ruling on the permissibility of
targeted killings in the West Bank and Gaza.52
The invocation of IHL in these circumstances has triggered
various points of controversy.53 One set of questions focuses on
targeted killing’s jus ad bellum dimension. When the United
As one U.S. court has noted, “[t]hese Articles, when read together, make clear
that a belligerent in a war cannot prosecute the soldiers of its foes for the
soldiers’ lawful acts of war.” United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553
(E.D. Va. 2002).
49. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) art. 6(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
50. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 262–69 (examining the U.S.
government’s arguments that the war on terrorism falls outside of traditional
categories of “conflict” and therefore is not governed by IHL).
51. See Koh, supra note 14 (using IHL’s framework, including its principles
of distinction and proportionality, in arguing that the targeted killing of bin
Laden was legal); Johnson, supra note 16 (discussing when targeted killing is
legal); Holder, supra note 16 (stipulating conditions under which targeted
killing is legal); Brennan, supra note 16 (discussing legal principles behind
targeted killing).
52. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel
para. 18 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/
02/690/007/ a34/02007690.a34.pdf (applying IHL to the armed conflicts in the
West Bank and Gaza).
53. For a summary of the principal legal questions involved, see Philip
Alston, U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, paras. 28–92, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies
/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf [hereinafter Alston Report].
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States launches an attack against an individual residing in
Pakistan or Yemen, does the attack represent a legitimate use of
force, or is the United States committing an act of aggression
against the territorial sovereignty of the state in which the attack
has taken place?54 Another set of questions focuses on whether
IHL is the operative body of law governing a particular killing,
the central issue being whether the use of lethal force reflects a
requisite nexus to an armed conflict (either international or noninternational in character).55 A third set of questions focuses on
54. See id. paras. 37–45 (describing the necessary conditions to allow a
targeted attack on an individual in another state’s territory); Van Schaack,
supra note 2, at 266–81 (surveying the jus ad bellum issues present in the
killing of Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Aulaqi); O’Connell, supra note 17, at
13 (“The drones used in Pakistan are lawful for use only on the battlefield. The
right to resort to them must be found in the jus ad bellum; the way they are
used must be based on the jus in bello and human rights.”); Paust, supra note
17, at 279 (concluding that, when acting in self-defense, a nation may attack
non-state actors in another state without that state’s permission); Kenneth
Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 369–70
(Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009) (discussing the targeting of terrorist suspects
without the territorial state’s consent).
On this point, special attention has focused on the scope of the right to selfdefense under international law, considering that non-state actors are often
killed across international borders. The ICJ has denied that such a right exists
with respect to armed attacks by non-state actors that are not imputable to a
state. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, paras. 138–39 (July 9)
(refusing to apply the inherent self-defense right to permit armed attacks when
the “attacks against [the U.N.-member state] are [not] imputable to a foreign
State”); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, paras. 235–36 (Dec. 19) (stating that
international responsibility only arises if injurious acts are imputed to a state).
Current U.S. policy dictates that the use of force can be permissible in those
circumstances, absent consent of the third state, provided the state is unable or
unwilling to deal effectively with the threat to the United States posed by the
non-state group. See Holder, supra note 16 (“[T]he use of force in foreign
territory [without consent] would be consistent with these international legal
principles . . . after a determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to
deal effectively with a threat to the United States.”); Brennan, supra note 16
(“There is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted
aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal force against our
enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved
consents or is unable or unwilling to take action . . . .”).
55. See Alston Report, supra note 53, paras. 46–56 (describing the existence
and scope of an armed conflict); MELZER, supra note 11, at 76–81 (stating that
“the applicability of IHL presupposes the existence of an international or non-
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whether the targets of attack—often un-uniformed individuals
suspected of membership in terrorist groups—are in fact subject
to attack under IHL, either because they have the status of
combatants who may be targeted at any time or because they are
civilians directly participating in hostilities when they are
targeted.56
These are vital questions whose resolution is critical to
establishing both the permissibility of many targeted killings and
the broader scope of anti-terrorism efforts. They are not, however,
the primary focus of this Article. We will instead largely assume
in this Part that IHL does in fact apply to bin Laden’s killing and
to other instances of targeted killing. We nevertheless argue that
IHL does not play as determinative a role in justifying targeted
killing as the current debate would suggest.
Subpart A strikes a cautionary note about the moral status of
the IHL rules.57 Understood in its best light, the scope of the
permission to kill in wartime does not reflect a fully developed
moral framework for killing, but instead reflects a body of law
that is largely reactive to the historical experience of warfare as
an inevitable evil that can at best be regulated on the margins so
international ‘armed conflict’”). The United States maintains that it is engaged
in armed conflict with al Qaeda and that the conflict extends beyond the borders
of Afghanistan. See Holder, supra note 16 (“Our legal authority is not limited to
the battlefields in Afghanistan. . . . We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone
to shifting operations from country to country.”); Johnson, supra note 16 (stating
that the conflict against al Qaeda requires military authority for necessary and
appropriate force to extend beyond the “‘hot’ battlefields of Afghanistan”); Koh,
supra note 14 (acknowledging “our armed conflict with al Qaeda”). Thus far, the
Obama Administration has not specified whether it considers this to be an
international or non-international armed conflict. For a discussion about the
complexities associated with both views, see Craig Martin, Going Medieval:
Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad Bellum Regime, in TARGETED
KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 223, 231 (Claire
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (“There continues
to be debate over the exact parameters of non-international armed conflict,
which are relevant to the controversy over the validity of the claim that the
United States is, as a matter of law, engaged in a ‘transnational armed conflict’
with [a]l Qaeda and others.” (citations omitted)).
56. See Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 146–47 (explaining that an
attack on an individual not wearing a uniform but suspected of involvement in
terrorism must be based on the target’s status as a combatant or as an agent of
a hostile force).
57. See infra Part II.A (highlighting moral issues implicated by targeted
killing and related international law).
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as to temper its inhumanity. This animating feature of IHL
cautions against efforts to interpret or expand the war rules to
nonparadigmatic cases, but it also cannot preclude the possibility
of such expansion. The law, after all, has already once
accommodated the reality that states employ more permissive
rules of killing than are generally permitted.
Subpart B explores problems of application that arise when
justifying targeted killings under IHL.58 Although the mere fact
of combatants being individually targeted need not raise unique
problems for IHL, the evolution of targeted killing as a distinct
and significant method of warfare puts pressure on IHL, testing
how the core legal requirements of necessity and discrimination
apply to operations whose mechanics depart significantly from
the types of combat that have traditionally informed IHL.
Subpart C details how the killing of Osama bin Laden
presents an especially difficult test case for the IHL rules given
that the functional mechanics of the operation—an isolated raid
on a single house in a noncombat area—resemble in many
respects the types of operations associated with law
enforcement.59 We are therefore skeptical that the scope of the
permission to kill should depend upon whether we label the
operation a wartime attack as opposed to, for example, an
operation to apprehend an especially dangerous criminal. Our
conclusion does not change, moreover, even assuming that the
United States could have permissibly elected alternate, less
discriminating means of killing bin Laden, such as by firing a
missile from an unmanned aerial vehicle.
A. The Morality of War and the Limits of International Law
As we just described, to invoke IHL in order to justify
targeted killing is to invoke a more permissive legal framework
toward killing. Underlying, but often ignored, in the
interpretation and application of IHL is a broader moral question
concerning why the law recognizes multiple legal paradigms for
58. See infra Part II.B (discussing the application of IHL to targeted
killings).
59. See infra Part II.C (examining the circumstances of bin Laden’s killing
with respect to the IHL framework).

1390

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1371 (2012)

killing at the outset. If society maintains that killing is wrong
except in very narrow circumstances—such as to prevent the
imminent use of lethal force by a wrongdoer—why should our
moral judgment change when dealing with wartime scenarios?
Why, in particular, should combatants not be bound by the same
rules that apply to law-enforcement officials in peacetime? The
question is not merely theoretical, as evidenced by the ongoing
debate over the application of IHL to targeted killing. Whether
and how we apply IHL to borderline or nonparadigmatic cases
should be informed, to some degree, by the moral arguments
supporting IHL’s creation.
Although the morality of killing in wartime is the central
focus of multiple intellectual traditions, including just-war
theory, the United Nations charter system, and, of course, IHL
itself, the nature of the permission to kill in war remains, in
many ways, perplexing.60 The conventional approach to justifying
this state of affairs generally proceeds along the following lines: A
state’s decision to employ the barbaric tactics of war must first be
justified only by overriding interests of utmost importance, most
paradigmatically the interest of self-defense against an armed
attack by another state.61 The nature of this interest further
necessitates, under strictly defined circumstances, the tactics
commonly associated with warfare. A state facing an invading
army will likely find it impossible to fend off the attack if it
commits itself to rules of engagement that limit killing to the
circumstances permitted by the law-enforcement paradigm.62
60. See JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 104–07 (2009) (discussing the
conflation of morality and legality in the body of international law governing
armed conflicts).
61. The right of self-defense is enshrined in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
which provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 51.
62. This reasoning finds expression in customary international law’s
general requirement that the use of armed force in self-defense be both
necessary and proportionate, precluding the use of force beyond that necessary
to repel an attack or restore the status quo ante. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v.
U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, para. 74 (Nov. 6) (“[W]hether the response to the [armed]
attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and
proportionality of the measures taken in self-defence.” (second alteration in
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Therefore, IHL grants a broader permission to kill, albeit the
permission is not absolute. Like the law-enforcement paradigm,
IHL places certain non-negotiable limits on killing.63 However, it
draws the line in a different, more permissive place.
Those who accept justifications of this nature still have
difficulty explaining why international law should embrace the
strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, such
that combatants fighting for illegal aggressors benefit from the
same permissive rules that apply to those acting in legitimate
self-defense. Walzer has defended this “moral equality of soldiers”
by appealing to the moral intuition that it is unfair to blame
soldiers merely for fighting wars on behalf of their state, when
doing so reflects their “routine habits of law-abidingness, their
fear, their patriotism, their moral investment in the state.”64
Moreover, because most combatants will predictably perceive
themselves to be fighting for the just side in war, a rule that
privileges just combatants over unjust combatants could serve to
increase the cruelty of war.65 There would be less incentive to
comply with even minimal rules of humane treatment if
combatants expect to be prosecuted by the opposing side merely
for participating in combat.66 Yet, even if one accepts these
arguments, it remains difficult to explain why the law should not

original) (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 194 (June 27))).
63. See MELZER, supra note 11, at 176 (stating that IHL, like the lawenforcement paradigm, requires necessity, proportionality, and precaution).
64. WALZER, supra note 40, at 39; see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS
DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY 21–22
(2008) (“The reason for adopting a rigorous distinction between jus ad bellum
and jus in bello is the need for a bright-line cleavage . . . . Soldiers . . . know
that, regardless of who started the conflict, certain means of warfare are clearly
illegal.”).
65. See WALZER, supra note 40, at 127–28 (stating that soldiers “are most
likely to believe that their wars are just,” and that the perspective of all soldiers
as morally equal allows for rules governing wartime conduct).
66. See MCMAHAN, supra note 60, at 191 (“[Soldiers] might reason, for
example, that if they will be punished in any case if they are defeated, . . . each
might have nothing to lose . . . from the commission of war crimes or atrocities
that would increase their chance of victory and thus of immunity to
punishment.”).
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impose some duty to resist participation upon combatants who
know that they are fighting an unjust war.67
As a historical matter, IHL did not emerge from abstract
deliberations concerning when killing might be morally
permissible. The modern jus in bello rules, developed through
international agreement in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, reflect instead an evolving response to the established
reality of warfare. For instance, the first international agreement
to prohibit the use of a weapon of war—the 1868 Saint
Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight68—speaks of
the “progress of civilization . . . alleviating as much as possible
the calamities of war” and of “conciliat[ing] the necessities of war
with the laws of humanity.”69 The literature on IHL is replete
with similar indications of a compromised morality, in which the
interests of humanity must compete against those of military
necessity.70
As Jeremy Waldron has written, the development of IHL in
this way “proceeded on the basis of moral sociology, discerning
the possibility of a viable norm of restraint in this area,” one “that
has emerged from centuries of ghastly conflict.”71 That IHL
relaxes the rule against murder, in other words, does not imbue
killing in war with a deep moral justification. Instead, IHL
67. See id. at 6 (arguing that “it is morally wrong to fight in a war that is
unjust because it lacks a just cause”). The author presents a systematic
argument rejecting the separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. See
id. (arguing “against the view that unjust combatants act permissibly when they
fight within the constraints of the traditional rules of jus in bello”).
68. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. 1) 474, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/130?Open
Document.
69. Id. at 474–75.
70. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary to Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,
392–93 (“The law of armed conflict is a compromise based on a balance between
military necessity, on the one hand, and the requirements of humanity, on the
other.”); id. at 399 (“Warfare entails a complete upheaval of values.”).
71. Jeremy Waldron, Justifying Targeted Killing with a Neutral Principle,
in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 112, 127
(Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012).
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principally seeks to impose at least some “regulative line that can
be defended (just!) in the midst of an activity that is otherwise
comprehensively murderous.”72
This feature of IHL has at least two important implications
for the debate over targeted killing. First, as Waldron argues, one
should exercise great caution about expanding IHL’s permissive
approach to killing.73 In particular, one should avoid the
automatic assumption that IHL reflects a principled approach to
killing that is readily susceptible to expansion by analogy.74 That,
as Waldron argues, is precisely “how a norm against murder
unravels.”75 This caution is warranted both with respect to
expanding the IHL rules beyond their present scope and to
interpreting the requirements of IHL as they apply within the
acknowledged scope of the law.
At the same time, the uncertain moral status of IHL also
makes it difficult to identify absolute limits on when states may
develop more permissive approaches to killing. In this respect,
the development of IHL stands as an important precedent for the
law’s adjusting the norm against murder to accommodate the
inevitability of certain state practices. Notwithstanding the
extreme caution that is warranted by this exercise, the very
existence of IHL also makes it difficult to preclude the
development of other analogous accommodations. If, for example,
technological advances facilitate the effective use of targeted
killing by states to combat terrorist organizations in ways that
fall outside the traditional boundaries of IHL, it becomes difficult
to say when precisely the law must hold the line and forbid the
practice or when, by contrast, the law may once again surrender
and draw a different line, one that tolerates the general practice
while seeking, as IHL does, to align it with some basic, more
minimal, principles of humanity.

72. Id.
73. See id. (“Understanding the background just outlined helps us
understand the great caution that must be brought to any attempt to change the
laws of war.”).
74. See id. at 128 (arguing that, in this context, the common analogies are
“all reckless ways to proceed”).
75. Id. at 131.
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It is instructive here to draw a contrast between the issue of
targeted killing and another debate that has figured prominently
in recent years, namely, the debate over U.S. interrogation policy
with respect to detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere.
Those who condemn the waterboarding of detainees, as well as
other “enhanced interrogation techniques,” may persuasively
invoke an absolute legal ban on any practices that qualify as
torture as defined under international law.76 This prohibition
appears most prominently in the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,77 an international treaty that has
received near-universal ratification by states.78 In addition to
prohibiting both torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment, the Convention defines torture as a criminal offense
subject to extradition obligations79 and specifies that states may
not torture individuals for purposes of information gathering or
76. See, e.g., David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of
Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 61, 79–81 (2005) (describing
the legal issues surrounding the Justice Department’s interpretation of what
actions constitute torture). Tellingly, the Administration of President George W.
Bush did not assert a justification for torture, but instead denied that
government interrogation practices amounted to torture. See, e.g., Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A at 27 (Aug. 1, 2002) (stating that international
decisions “have found various aggressive interrogation methods” to not
constitute torture); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Defends Interrogations, Saying
Interrogation Methods Aren’t Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, at A1 (pointing
out the controversies regarding the ever-expanding executive authority to
pursue terror suspects).
77. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113.
78. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Participants,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-`9.
en.pdf (listing the signatories to the Convention and their respective reservations).
79. See U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 77, art. 1 (defining torture); id.
art. 4 (mandating that “acts of torture” be punishable criminal offences); id. art.
8 (mandating that these acts be “included as extraditable offences”); id. art. 16
(requiring states to prevent public officials’ “other acts of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined
in article 1”).
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any other reason.80 It also states that “[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture.”81 Thus, opponents of
torture may invoke the Convention as evidence that the
international community has given the question of torture
explicit attention and has judged that an absolute ban is
required, one that allows no derogation.
The problem of killing, by contrast, is accompanied by no
such absolute ban. And the ways in which IHL already permits
killing are dependent on precisely the type of instrumental
reasoning that international law rejects in the torture context.82
Again, this is not to say that one should proceed lightly in
justifying expansive permissions for government-sponsored
killing. The norm against murder, as Waldron notes, is not just
any norm, and proposals to further dilute it must be met with
great skepticism.83 But the structure of IHL also cautions against
absolute proclamations.84
In Parts III and IV, we will explore further the possibility of
justifying some targeted killing outside of both IHL and
traditional law-enforcement paradigms. In the remainder of this
Part, we explore reasons why, when IHL does govern a targeted
80. See id. arts. 1–2 (defining torture and requiring measures to prevent
torture).
81. Id. art. 2, para. 2. The Convention also obligates each state to
“undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to
torture.” Id. art. 16, para. 1. The Convention does not explicitly define these
practices or regulate them with the same detail it employs for torture, but
neither does the Convention acknowledge any exceptions to this prohibition. See
id. (prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment without listing any
exceptions).
82. See id. arts. 1–2 (prohibiting torture for any reason, including state of
war or other public emergencies).
83. See Waldron, supra note 71, at 131 (“What is objectionable is the
inherently abusive character of the attitude [behind] reasoning that says: ‘We
are allowed to kill some people by principles we already have; surely, by the
same reasoning, in our present circumstances of insecurity, there must be other
people we are also allowed to murder.’”).
84. See, e.g., U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 77, arts. 1–16 (refusing to
proscribe killing explicitly and absolutely).
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killing, this body of law is not as determinative as is often
supposed.85
B. IHL and Targeted Killing
1. The Permission to Kill by Name
A threshold question is whether a practice of individualized,
“named” killing is ever compatible with IHL. Some scholars have
questioned the practice of targeted killing on the grounds that it
personalizes the conduct of war in a manner incompatible with
the underlying moral vocabulary of war.86 Michael Gross, for
example, traces a prohibition on named killing to the seminal
Lieber Code of 1863,87 which admonishes:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual
belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the
hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial
by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows
such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such
outrage.88

As Gross elaborates, the permission to kill in wartime
presupposes the moral belligerents’ innocence, and both the
combatants’ permission to kill and their vulnerability to being
killed derives from their role as impersonal agents of a collective
entity, the state.89 The problem with targeting individuals on this
85. See infra notes 86–148 (discussing the application of IHL to targeted
killing).
86. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 17, at 327–29 (questioning the morality of
targeted killing in wartime); Statman, supra note 17, at 190 (arguing that “the
problem with targeted killing” is that it undermines “the very justification for
killing in war,” which is that we ignore an enemy’s personal merits or demerits).
87. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), (Apr. 24, 1863)
[hereinafter Lieber Code], available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?
OpenDocument (setting forth a code of conduct for martial law).
88. Id. art. 148.
89. See Gross, supra note 17, at 326 (“No one is suggesting that soldiers do
not represent material threats . . . . [A]ny uniformed soldier is vulnerable. . . .
Soldiers may kill in the service of their state and are therefore innocent of any
wrongdoing, a sweeping authorization that international law and all nations
endorse.”).
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account is that “[o]nce we name soldiers for killing, . . . we upset
this innocence with precisely the argument that Lieber presents.
Naming names assigns guilt and, as Lieber suggests, proclaims
soldiers outlaws. In doing so, named killing places war itself
beyond convention.”90
We do not share Gross’s concern about named killing. More
precisely, we do not believe that it is the practice of naming
targets itself that triggers Gross’s concern. Indeed, even the
Lieber Code passage just quoted addresses a concern distinct
from the practice of named killing per se. The Code focuses on a
broad class of potential victims, including not only those
belonging to “the hostile army,” but also those who are merely
“citizen[s]” or “subject[s],” and thus outside the class of those
permissibly targetable in war.91 It is, moreover, concerned with
the proclaiming of individuals as “outlaw[s]” such that they “may
be slain without trial by any captor.”92 The focus, therefore, is on
the punitive killing of captured persons. The Code does not
address whether belligerents may conduct named killings for
other reasons and in other contexts.
There are indeed contexts in which named killing may
operate as a routine battlefield practice without violating the
moral innocence of targeted combatants. Fernando Tesón
supplies the helpful example of a soldier who is targeted on the
battlefield because he is an especially skilled machine gunner,
who has proven adept at cutting down opposing soldiers seeking
to advance.93 He maintains, correctly in our view, that it is
permissible to target the machine gunner as a battlefield
strategy.94 This sort of individualized targeting of an especially

90. Id.
91. Lieber Code, supra note 87, art. 148.
92. Id.
93. See Fernando R. Tesón, Targeted Killing in War and Peace: A
Philosophical Analysis, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 403, 411 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew
Altman eds., 2012) (giving the example of soldiers on a battlefield who target a
particularly effective enemy machine gunner).
94. See id. (“He is an unjust enemy combatant and as such may be
permissibly killed, named or unnamed.”).
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dangerous opponent reflects a straightforward pursuit of military
advantage.95
Suppose now, as Tesón posits, that the opposing army
happens to have learned the name of its target. Suppose, for
example, that the belligerents facing the skilled machine gunner
know that he is the infamous “Private Gunner.”96 The
permissibility of an order to “take out Private Gunner before he
cuts down any more of us” does not become illegal, or even
immoral, merely because the target has now been named. What
makes this an easy case is that the naming is incidental.
Although Gunner is individually targeted, he is not targeted in
his individual capacity. In this case it is wrong to say that
“[n]aming names assigns guilt and . . . proclaims soldiers
outlaws.”97 The targeting of Gunner preserves his moral
innocence; it recognizes the danger that he poses as an especially
effective combatant.
As Gross himself recognizes,98 such naming also assumes
importance in the context of conflicts against terrorist groups who
do not observe the formalities of war, including the core
requirements that combatants carry arms openly, have a “fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,” and “conduct[] their
95. One need not draw on hypothetical examples to justify such targeting.
Consider the example of World War II German panzer ace Michael Wittmann
who, at the battle of Villers-Bocage, commanded a tank that destroyed, within a
space of fifteen minutes, at least eleven Allied tanks, nine half-track vehicles,
four troop carriers, and two anti-tank guns, singlehandedly prompting Allied
forces to abandon the recently captured village before a single German
reinforcement had arrived. See GEORGE FORTY, VILLERS BOCAGE 57–86 (Simon
Trew ed., 2004) (describing Michael Wittmann’s fighting at Villers-Bocage and
stating that he personally destroyed “seven cruiser/medium tanks (including one
Firefly), three Stuart light tanks, one Sherman OP, nine half-tracks, four
carriers and two anti-tank guns”); DANIEL TAYLOR, VILLERS-BOCAGE: THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE GERMAN WAR PHOTOGRAPHER 33 (1999) (describing Wittmann’s
role in the battle and stating that he destroyed “seven gun tanks, one of which
may have been a Firefly, three Stuarts, one Sherman OP, nine half-tracks, four
carriers and two anti-tank guns”). To the extent Allied forces were subsequently
capable of identifying Wittmann on the battlefield, surely they would be
justified in taking special effort to destroy his tank.
96. In Tesón’s original hypothetical, he is named “Colonel Sanders.” Tesón,
supra note 93, at 411.
97. Gross, supra note 17, at 326.
98. See id. at 329 (assessing the appropriateness of named killing against
terrorists).
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operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”99
Those who fail to qualify as privileged combatants may
nevertheless be attacked “for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities.”100 The reach of this provision is currently a matter
of controversy.101 A civilian targeted in the act of firing a machine
gun on the battlefield is an easy case, and the legal advisor to
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has further
opined that civilians who have assumed a “continuous combat
function” may be treated as regular members of organized armed
groups.102
More divisive is how to apply IHL to terrorism suspects who
may spend months or even years planning attacks in hiding.103
Assuming we do treat such persons as belligerents, a practice of
named killing may in fact be essential because, as Gross
observes, there are no means to identify such persons as
belligerents absent individualized assessment.104 Accepting this
logic does not, however, require us to adopt a special terrorismbased exception to a prohibition against named killing, as Gross
would seem to suggest.105 Instead, it merely reinforces the
broader point that there is no inherent tension between the
99. POW Convention, supra note 48, art. 4(A)(2).
100. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(3).
101. See Gross, supra note 17, at 326 (noting the lack of consensus “about
the status of those who belong to an organization that does not meet the
minimal standards set by [Additional] Protocol I”).
102. See Legal Adviser to the Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under
International Humanitarian Law, 31–36 (May 2009) (by Nils Melzer)
[hereinafter ICRC Guidance], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files
/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf (distinguishing between civilians and members of
organized armed groups).
103. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED
KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 60, 63 (Claire
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (discussing the
threats terrorists pose, individually and collectively, and arguing for a
membership-based approach to identifying belligerents).
104. See Gross, supra note 17, at 330 (discussing the problem of identifying
as combatants “guerrillas, militants, terrorists and others without uniforms”
and stating that naming can be useful or even necessary in such cases).
105. See id. at 331 (“Perhaps targeted killings are an appropriate response
to terrorism precisely because terrorists deserve to suffer harm in a way that
just combatants do not.”).
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concept of named killing itself and the paradigm of international
humanitarian law.
2. Targeted Killing in a Global Battlefield
None of this is to say, however, that there is nothing in the
practice of naming targets that challenges the structure of IHL.
Returning to Tesón’s machine-gunner example, suppose that
military officials deem Gunner so dangerous that, so long as the
war continues and he remains in military service, he is to be
tracked and killed wherever he may be found. Intelligence
officials trace Gunner to an island resort where he is enjoying an
extended vacation with his family. A special commando unit is
dispatched to kill him with instructions to follow the usual war
rules of engagement. The commandos locate Gunner and shoot
him while he is sunbathing on the beach. We suspect that many
readers will be more troubled by this scenario than by our
previous hypothetical, although it can be difficult to explain why.
a. The Feasibility of Capture
One troubling aspect of this hypothetical scenario is that the
commandos have elected to neutralize Gunner’s machine-gun
skills by killing him instead of capturing him and holding him as
a prisoner of war until the termination of hostilities. Note that
under Koh’s justification of bin Laden’s killing, this aspect of the
operation is permissible so long as Gunner has not clearly
communicated his surrender.106 If we embrace Koh’s statement as
reflecting an inflexible rule applying to all belligerents in war,
then it makes no difference to the law that Gunner poses no risk
at all to the commandos, or that capture would be easy under the
circumstances.107
106. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (describing Koh’s
justification of the bin Laden killing).
107. Note that U.S. government officials have indicated that the feasibility
of capture may be a factor in the lawfulness of a targeted killing when the
killing is directed against a U.S. citizen, as was the case with Anwar al-Aulaqi.
See Holder, supra note 16 (stating that targeted killing of a U.S. citizen terrorist
is lawful at least when there is an imminent threat of violent attack, “capture is
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This, however, cannot be an accurate statement of the jus in
bello rules, at least not if they are to be interpreted and applied in
a way that is consistent with a plausible account of morality. The
question of whether and when international law imposes a duty
to capture rather than kill lawful targets of war has provoked
debate in recent years. The Supreme Court of Israel’s 2005 ruling
on Israel’s targeted killing policy stated that “a civilian taking a
direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is
doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed,”108 and the
ICRC’s subsequent non-binding guidance on the notion of direct
participation in hostilities argued more broadly that “it would
defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain
from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender where there
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”109 But these
pronouncements have not attracted widespread acceptance; the
ICRC’s conclusion, in particular, faced significant resistance from
many of the experts whom the ICRC had invited to participate in
its study.110
The doctrinal argument favoring attempted capture in these
circumstances appeals to a requirement of military necessity, the
idea that the law permits “only that degree and kind of force, not
otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required
in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely
not feasible,” and the operation would be conducted according to law of war
principles). This distinction between citizens and non-citizens does not derive
from IHL, and official statements regarding the killing of bin Laden and other
foreign terrorists have not included the general feasibility of capture as a legally
relevant factor, except in the narrowly defined circumstances Koh identified,
which require “a genuine offer of surrender that is clearly communicated” and
that may be safely received. Koh, supra note 14.
108. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel
¶ 40 [2005] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/
a34/02007690.a34.pdf.
109. ICRC Guidance, supra note 102, at 82.
110. See id. at 82 n.221 (“During the expert meetings, it was generally
recognized that the approach [to choose capture over killing] is unlikely to be
operable in classic battlefield situations . . . and that armed forces . . . may not
always have the means or opportunity to capture rather than kill.”); W. Hays
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769,
799–801 (2010) (summarizing experts’ objections to Part IX of the ICRC
Guidance).
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the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest
possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and
resources.”111 The problem with this appeal is that IHL has
traditionally declined to translate the necessity principle into
rules that protect the lives of combatants themselves.112
This asymmetry finds expression in the Civil-War era Lieber
Code, which provides that “[m]ilitary necessity admits of all
direct destruction of life or limb of ‘armed’ enemies.”113 A similar
selectivity appears in the requirements of Additional Protocol I,
which gives effect to the restraint of military necessity. The
employment of “weapons, projectiles and material and methods of
warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering” is forbidden.114 Objects are not proper military targets
unless their destruction “offers a definite military advantage.”115
Attacks on military targets are forbidden if expected to result in
incidental loss to civilians or civilian objects that is excessive
compared to the “concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”116 Yet no parallel provision imposes a necessitybased limitation on the use of lethal force against combatants
themselves.117
How does one reconcile this omission with the general
principle that necessity justifies the permissive rules of IHL? The
most plausible explanation appeals to military necessity itself.
111. ICRC Guidance, supra note 102, at 79 (quoting United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, ¶ 2.2). This
language closely mirrors that set forth in the Lieber Code. See Lieber Code,
supra note 87, art. 14 (“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized
nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for
securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law
and usages of war.”).
112. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (pointing out the inconsistent
application of the necessity principle).
113. Lieber Code, supra note 87, art. 15. Only with respect to “other
persons” does the Code require that destruction be “incidentally ‘unavoidable.’”
Id.
114. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art 35.
115. Id. art. 52(2).
116. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
117. See Parks, supra note 110, at 804 (“There is no ‘military necessity’
determination requirement for an individual soldier to engage an enemy
combatant or a civilian determined to be taking a direct part in hostilities, any
more than there is for a soldier to attack an enemy tank.”).
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The law generally permits the killing of all enemy combatants,
without imposing any obligation to assess the military value of
individual targets or to consider less lethal means, because the
modalities of war generally do not permit those pursuing military
advantage to make such individualized assessments. The nature
of armed conflict through history has been to pursue victory
precisely through the destruction of the opposing forces. In the
context of the traditional battlefield, belligerents are generally
justified in treating all opposing forces as sources of danger and
as targets whose destruction has military advantage. A rule to
the contrary, one that requires combatants to make
individualized threat assessments for each targeted enemy,
would burden the waging of war in ways not acceptable to states,
including by exposing combatants to increased risk.118 On this
118. Such practical considerations inform W. Hays Parks’s opposition to
Part IX of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law. See Parks,
supra note 110, at 809–10 (arguing against a necessity-based limit on the use of
lethal force against combatants). Parks reasoned:
[O]ther than the law of war prohibitions on perfidy and denial of
quarter, governments and courts have seen the prudence in declining
to draw such a line owing to the many vagaries that exist not only in
domestic law enforcement situations but also, and in particular, on
the battlefield. This is the case in combat in recognition of the
obligation imposed by many nations on their military forces not to
surrender and, indeed, to resist surrender either by force or through
escape and evasion.
Id. On this point, Parks is especially concerned by the prospect that the ICRC
Guidance would require individual soldiers to apply a “use-of-force continuum.”
See id. at 796 (arguing that the ICRC Guidance wrongly “resurrects and offers
Pictet’s unaccepted use-of-force continuum theory as if it were an internationally
accepted, binding legal formula”). Pictet’s theory is best summarized by his
statement that
[i]f we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not
wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we
must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same
military advantage, we must choose the one which causes the lesser
evil.
JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 75–76 (1985). The ICRC Guidance, however, interprets this statement to
support the more basic point that “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill
an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to surrender
where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.” ICRC
Guidance, supra note 102, at 82. The ICRC Guidance also acknowledges that
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account, the general rule permitting the targeting of all
combatants who are not hors de combat is not so much a violation
of the necessity principle as an expression of it.
This account loses all plausibility, however, when we imagine
circumstances, such as the killing of Gunner on vacation, that
bear no resemblance to the battlefield modalities that have
historically animated IHL, and that present no functional reason
why a more permissive rule to killing should prevail. When
Gunner is found isolated from active combat or other military
presence and is defenseless in a bathing suit, there is no account
of military necessity with which one can make sense of a rule that
permits killing short of surrender, or indeed of any rule that
would be more tolerant of killing than that applicable to lawenforcement officials seeking to apprehend Gunner under like
circumstances.
One could argue that Gunner’s utter defenselessness has
already placed him “in the power of an adverse Party” and thus
rendered him hors de combat.119 The ICRC Commentary to
Additional Protocol I supports this view.120 If that is correct, then
the permission to kill Gunner under IHL is already weaker than
suggested by Koh’s account of IHL in the context of the bin Laden
killing. More broadly, however, a rule permitting the killing of
Gunner under these circumstances runs up against a deep
structural constraint that is foundational to IHL: the idea that
IHL’s expanded permission to kill is, at some level, linked to and

Pictet’s proposed approach “is unlikely to be operable in classic battlefield
situations involving large-scale confrontations and that armed forces operating
in situations of armed conflict, even if equipped with sophisticated weaponry and
means of observation, may not always have the means or the opportunity to
capture rather than kill.” Id. at 82 n.221 (citations omitted).
119. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art 41.
120. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 70, at 484 (maintaining
that Protocol I reflected the determination of states to embrace the protections
of hors de combat status in cases in which land forces “have the adversary at
their mercy by means of overwhelmingly superior firing power to the point
where they can force the adversary to cease combat”). This claim has support in
the change from the Third Geneva Convention’s reference to those who have
“‘fallen into the power’ of the enemy” to Protocol I’s parallel reference, “in the
power of an adverse Party.” Id. “A defenceless adversary,” the Commentary
continues, “is ‘hors de combat’ whether or not he has laid down arms.” Id.
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justified by considerations of military necessity.121 The problem is
not merely that Gunner’s specific killing lacks military necessity
given the feasibility of capture but also that a general rule
permitting him to be killed under these circumstances is itself
irreconcilable with an account of military necessity, or indeed
with the pursuit of any military advantage.122
Accordingly, to identify a capture duty in these
circumstances does not, as W. Hays Parks has feared, implement
a fundamental alteration in IHL by requiring individual soldiers
to always consider the feasibility of capture before deploying
lethal force.123 Instead, our conclusion rests on the more modest
insight that IHL’s generally broad permission to kill reflects some
basic assumptions about battlefield modalities. When IHL travels
to contexts that, as a functional matter, fail the most expansive
definition of a battlefield, the overarching requirement of
necessity must be appraised anew.
Some scholars have reached a similar conclusion on the
ground that targeted killing occupies a hybrid position between
the IHL paradigm and the law-enforcement paradigm. This, for
instance, is how Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann understand
the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling that IHL properly applied to
Israel’s policy of targeted killings, but that the legality of those
killings hinged on the absence of a reasonable alternative for
capturing the targeted terrorists.124 Or, as Nils Melzer would see
it, the case we have just presented supports the view that
necessity itself must dictate whether the legal paradigm is IHL or
law-enforcement.125 In other words, the law-enforcement
121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of military necessity in state-sanctioned killing).
122. Given the lack of necessity, moreover, any resultant risk to civilians
posed by employing lethal force against Gunner would necessarily be
impermissible under the proportionality test. See Additional Protocol I, supra
note 39, art. 51(5)(b) (protecting civilians from harm that “would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”).
123. See supra note 118 (discussing Parks’s concern).
124. See Blum & Heymann, supra note 17, at 158 (arguing that “the court’s
requirement to try to apprehend the terrorist is far more easily situated within
a law-enforcement model of regular policing operations and signifies the
uneasiness that the court felt about the war paradigm”).
125. See ICRC Guidance, supra note 102, at 82 (“[I]t would defy the basic
notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an
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paradigm applies to the Gunner killing because there is no
necessity supporting the invocation of the IHL paradigm.
Whether we phrase the argument that way or not is largely a
matter of semantics in this instance, however, because we arrive
at the same conclusion under the IHL paradigm itself. Indeed, in
our example, Gunner is a lawful combatant participating in a
traditional armed conflict, and we have made no assumptions
that his targeting is informed by law-enforcement considerations
of any sort. Either paradigm yields the same result under the
facts presented.
Critically, the difficulties we have just described are not a
direct consequence of named targeting per se. It is not the act of
naming Gunner for killing that complicates the decision to kill
rather than capture. At the same time, this problem is one that is
distinctly associated with a practice of individualized targeting.
The impulse to follow Gunner across the world is one that derives
from assigning unique danger to him as an individual, rather
than as an anonymous and substitutable member of the broader
collective force that remains engaged on the battlefield. And it is
this impulse that puts pressure on IHL by asking us how its
requirements apply under nonparadigmatic conditions that do
not resemble those of a conventional battlefield.
b. The Harm of a Diffuse Battlefield
Killing Gunner on vacation also raises other problems that
are distinct from the question of capture. We may bring these into
focus by assuming that capturing Gunner is infeasible. Perhaps
there is only a short window of time to neutralize him before he
becomes untraceable, and the only feasible option is a missile
strike. The operation now entails killing Gunner and unavoidable
risk to the civilians in Gunner’s proximity.
This version of the hypothetical more directly raises the issue
of proportionality: is the risk to civilians justifiable in light of the
military advantage to be gained by killing Gunner?126 But the
opportunity to surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of
lethal force.”).
126. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(5)(b).
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problem is also broader than the direct risk to specific civilians.
There is something unsettling in the spread of war tactics beyond
the conventional battlefield, in the idea that war may follow
individual belligerents wherever they go. It is disturbing in
particular to reflect on the fate of the persons and property in the
area surrounding Gunner, that may now be victimized by jus in
bello rules that treat them as potential collateral damage whose
incidental destruction may be weighed against the utility of
targeting Gunner. This fear that war may strike anywhere at any
time has figured prominently in recent debates over U.S.
targeted-killing policy. Critics have asked whether, with the
inevitable spread of technology, we are willing to commit to a
reading of the law that would allow, for example, Iran to launch
missile strikes on U.S. cities against discrete individuals whom it
considers to be enemy combatants.127
Typically, this problem is treated as one of jus ad bellum.
International law takes account of the dangers of spreading war
by limiting the conditions under which states may permissibly
resort to armed force,128 and the targeting of Gunner may
constitute an act of aggression against the state where he is
vacationing. The conditions under which a state may resort to
armed force on the territory of a neutral third state is currently a
matter of debate,129 but that debate is not the end of the matter.
The jus ad bellum issue may be overcome: perhaps Gunner is
vacationing in a state that has given its consent to the raid,130 or
that is already party to the conflict. We will further assume, for
127.

See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE VIOLENCE OF PEACE: AMERICA’S WARS
AGE OF OBAMA 60–61 (2010) (acknowledging that a similar strike against
the United States would be justified if our targeted killings are justified against
those we deem terrorists).
128. See supra II.A (discussing IHL’s limits on use of force).
129. See supra note 54 (providing several scholars’ discussions about
targeting terrorist suspects on third-party territory).
130. Indeed, in many cases of targeted killing, including in northwest
Pakistan and in Yemen, the United States has benefitted from persuasive
claims to state consent. See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 267 (noting that
targeting killing operations in northwest Pakistan “likely enjoy at least some
tacit diplomatic acquiescence, even though Pakistani officials occasionally
publicly criticize them for domestic political consumption”); id. at 266 (observing
that the operation against Anwar al-Aulaqi “appears to have had the benefit of
Yemen’s consent and perhaps its involvement”).
IN THE
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purposes of this discussion, that IHL applies away from the
traditional battlefield and follows Gunner to his vacation spot.131
There is some debate in the literature concerning whether a
combatant is ever targetable when located away from the
battlefield.132 Yet even assuming that IHL governs this scenario,
the attack remains troubling pursuant to IHL’s requirement of
proportionality. In real life, even an ace machine gunner like
Gunner is unlikely to be perceived, simply on account of his
combat skills, as sufficiently dangerous to justify the type of
dedicated operation we have imagined. We may therefore also
question whether it is permissible, consistent with the demands
of proportionality, to risk civilian lives in this way merely to
neutralize a single combat soldier.
Arguments of this nature are complicated by the
indeterminacy of the legal standard. To compare—as the
proportionality formula requires—the “concrete and direct
military advantage” against the expected “incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination
thereof”133
requires
the
weighing
of
incommensurables.134 The law also fails to specify the extent to
which combatants must put their own forces at risk in order to
reduce risks to civilians.135 As a consequence, application of the
131. On problems associated with the geography of IHL, see Laurie R.
Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism,
39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2–6 (2010).
132. Compare Tesón, supra note 93, at 412–15 (arguing that a combatant on
vacation is an impermissible target), with Statman, supra note 17, at 196
(rejecting the distinction between a combatant in military headquarters and a
combatant on vacation).
133. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 51(5)(b).
134. See Final Rep. to the Prosecutor by the Comm. Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Fed. Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 48
(June 13, 2000), available at www.icty.org/sid/10052 (“Unfortunately, most
applications of the principle of proportionality are not quite so clear cut. It is
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms . . . .
One cannot easily assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to
capturing a particular military objective.”).
135. Additional Protocol I requires combatants to take “all feasible
precautions” to avoid loss of civilian life but does not specify what is meant by
“feasible.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). On the problem
of force protection versus enemy civilian protection, see David J. Luban, Risk
Taking and Force Protection 38 (Georgetown Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 11-
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proportionality formula inevitably extends great deference to
military judgment.
Does this already-difficult calculus necessarily change
because Gunner is on vacation? We think it does. Although it is
impossible to demark the precise point at which claims of
military advantage fail to outweigh incidental risk to civilians, we
believe that many will intuitively and justifiably conclude that
any version of our Gunner-on-vacation hypothetical involving risk
to civilians presents a case in which an attack on a military
target cannot be justified in light of the danger posed to civilians.
With respect to the military advantage side of the equation,
one difference between the battlefield and vacation settings is
that the killing of Gunner on the battlefield more readily
contributes to an immediate, more general military goal. If, for
example, Gunner is killed during a battle to seize a strategic
village, advance the front line, or defend a position, then the
value of his individual death is subsumed by the military
advantage associated with that broader objective. Even though he
is targeted individually, the targeting occurs in the context of an
operation that necessitates the killing of enemy combatants, and,
in that broader context, there are sound reasons to give special
attention to the threat posed by Gunner. When Gunner is
specifically targeted on vacation, by contrast, one is forced to
focus on him in isolation and ask how much military advantage is
anticipated from the neutralization of Gunner alone, outside of
any immediate battlefield context. It is true that Gunner is now
unable to return to the battlefield and thus is prevented from
making future military contributions. But this causal link is more
speculative and attenuated, and it is harder to demonstrate why
Gunner merits such individualized attention.
The dangers to civilians likewise require more focused
attention. When a rocket attack on the vacationing Gunner kills
bystanders, it is clear that the lives lost are casualties of the
attack on Gunner alone. Individual incidents on the battlefield
may also have this but-for quality, but there is also a generalized
risk that exists in areas of continuous combat. Consider the
Allied advance in Normandy during World War II, which, by
72, 2011), in READING WALZER (Itzhak Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds.,
forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1855263.
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some estimates, claimed close to 20,000 French civilian lives.136
At a broad level of generality, one can say that these large-scale
civilian deaths were a tragic, but predictable, feature of the
campaign to liberate France. Although that broad point did not
relieve individual combatants of a duty to protect civilian life in
particular engagements, it was easier to justify incidental civilian
losses in the context of a broader campaign that necessarily
imposed a generalized risk on all of Normandy’s residents. When
Gunner is targeted on vacation, by contrast, it becomes clearer
that the attack has put a class of civilians in danger, a class that
faced no special risks otherwise. The risk to civilians, in other
words, is a risk associated most directly with the decision to
target Gunner. This feature of the attack only serves to exert
further pressure on the planners of the attack to justify the
special attention owed to Gunner.
One may, in addition, identify harm to Gunner himself.
Although Gunner is targetable as a combatant in the theater of
war, his liability to be killed derives not from personal
culpability, but from his commitment—voluntary or not—to
render himself liable through service as a combatant fighting for
a broader collective. Although the point is arguable, one can
reasonably maintain that there is a limit to this commitment, and
that Gunner has a justified expectation that his liability to be
killed in battle does not entail a liability to be singled out and
chased across the world in this manner.
For reasons already addressed, it is impossible to demark the
precise point at which claims of military advantage fail to
outweigh incidental risk to civilians, but we believe that many
will intuitively conclude that our Gunner-on-vacation
hypothetical presents a case in which an attack on a military
target cannot be justified if the attack poses any danger to
civilians. These considerations all urge special caution with
respect to targeted-killing operations that invoke the permissive
IHL rules in contexts outside the traditional battlefield.
We do not argue, however, that IHL can or should be
interpreted to impose a blanket ban on targeted killings. Our
136. See ANTONY BEEVOR, D-DAY: THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY 519 (2009)
(stating that 19,890 French civilians were killed during the liberation of
Normandy).
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hypothetical case of Gunner on vacation is admittedly far-fetched,
and the cases of targeted killing that have provoked controversy
in recent years have benefited from more compelling appeals to
necessity than what we have imagined here. Our point, rather, is
that when targeted killing moves away from the traditional
battlefield, its permissibility will generally require special
justification in at least two interrelated ways, both of which flow
naturally from the application of IHL and do not borrow from the
law-enforcement paradigm.
First, the targeted killing of an individual in these
circumstances generally cannot be justified merely by the target’s
status as a combatant. The targeting instead requires special
justification regarding the threat that the individual poses, either
in isolation or in combination with others who are similarly
targeted.137 For example, such a justification may present itself
when the target poses an imminent or especially high threat; the
target wields significant authority within an enemy organization;
or there is sound reason to believe that a policy of targeting likesituated persons will, in the aggregate, prove sufficiently feasible
to have a significant military advantage. Second, when military
operations target isolated individuals, the acceptable risk of
civilian casualties must generally be lower than in more
conventional military operations.
These considerations are especially salient to the difficult
interpretive question of how to determine which nontraditional
combatants may be targeted, pursuant to IHL, as civilians
directly participating in hostilities.138 For example, even if one
maintains (as we do not) that this category should be read
broadly to encompass all members of terrorist organizations
engaged in hostilities,139 that interpretation will be unlikely to
satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality in
concrete cases of targeted killing. Civilian lives should not be
risked, for example, in order to kill a member of al Qaeda whose
137. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (describing
circumstances in which an individual may be targeted because of the especially
dangerous threat that he poses).
138. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (stating that civilians
may be targeted if they participate in hostilities).
139. See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 103, at 84–85 (suggesting that all members
of terrorist organizations might be engaged in continuous combat function).
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contribution to the group is known to consist only of cooking
meals or sweeping floors.140 This remains the case whether or not
one labels the target a combatant under IHL.
Notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in reducing these
intuitions to concrete operational guidance, evolving U.S. policies
affirm the special sensitivities that accompany targeted killing as
a strategy of war. Gregory McNeal has documented that U.S.
policy for preplanned aerial drone strikes in Afghanistan have
generally required a collateral damage estimation process that is
intended to ensure that there will be a less than 10% probability
of serious or lethal wounds to non-combatants.141 He reports that
“less than [1%] of pre-planned operations that followed the
collateral damage estimation process resulted in collateral
damage.”142 Moreover, when even one civilian casualty is
expected, the President of the United States or the Secretary of
Defense must personally approve the strike.143 Even considering
that official U.S. casualty claims reportedly rely on a contested
criterion that generally “counts all military-age males in a strike
zone as combatants,”144 these policies reflect a concern for
limiting incidental civilian casualties that goes far beyond the
indeterminate guidance provided by Additional Protocol I.

140. The more difficult cases concern financiers and others who occupy
significant positions in the group but whose functions are not obviously
analogous to traditional combat functions. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm.
Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel ¶ 35 [2005] (Isr.), available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf
(noting
that “a person who aids the unlawful combatants by general strategic analysis,
and grants them logistical, general support, including monetary aid” does not
directly participate in hostilities, but that there “is a debate surrounding the
following case: a person driving a truck carrying ammunition”).
141. Gregory S. McNeal, Are Targeted Killings Unlawful? A Case Study in
Empirical Claims Without Empirical Evidence, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND
MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 326, 328 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David
Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012).
142. Id. at 331.
143. Id. According to a recent New York Times article, the President’s
involvement is even greater than mandated by this policy. See Becker & Shane,
supra note 23 (“[N]ominations go to the White House, where by his own
insistence and guided by Mr. Brennan, Mr. Obama must approve any name. He
signs off on every strike in Yemen and Somalia and also on the more complex
and risky strikes in Pakistan—about a third of the total.”).
144. Becker & Shane, supra note 23.
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3. The Problem of Guilt

Our final twist on the Gunner scenario deals with questions
of culpability and mixed motives. Suppose that the officer who
orders Gunner’s killing on the battlefield is motivated by reasons
other than Gunner’s machine-gun skills. It turns out that Gunner
is a villain who, before the war, murdered the officer’s family. The
officer therefore invokes the rules of war opportunistically, as a
cloak to disguise what is in fact a desire to exact revenge.
One might argue that Gunner, as a combatant in armed
conflict, remains liable to be killed under the IHL rules, and thus
has no right to complain of his killing. So long as hostilities
persist, opposing combatants may kill Gunner at any time. From
one perspective, that the officer has a grudge against Gunner
should not matter any more than that the officer might be
fighting only for reasons of financial self-interest rather than
patriotism. The individual motives of combatants have, at best,
limited relevance when combatants act in conformity with the
broader policy of the state or collective entity they serve. And
here it is the state’s policy that combatants such as Gunner
should be attacked even when they are not villains.
Nonetheless, we suspect that most readers will agree that
the targeting of Gunner under the circumstances described is
unsustainable under the IHL paradigm. The problem with killing
Gunner on account of his past crimes is that his targeting is not
informed in any way by military considerations. Thus, the
problem is similar to the one presented by our Gunner-on-thebeach hypothetical. This culpability-driven targeting is precisely
the sort of killing that justifiably triggers Gross’s objection, which
he associates more broadly (and incorrectly in our view) with the
very concept of targeted killing.145 Here, the killing assigns guilt
to Gunner in his individual capacity, thereby abusing the
permission to kill that derives solely from Gunner’s impersonal
status as an agent of the state.146
145. See Gross supra note 17, at 328 (suggesting that targeted killings based
on an assumption of guilt place these killings outside the scope of just-war
conventions that allow killing combatants without due process of the law).
146. We do not attempt here to resolve more difficult permutations of our
hypothetical in which the officer’s motives are mixed. For example, suppose
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In Parts III and IV, we explore the possibility that individual
culpability may, in special circumstances, factor into
justifications for targeted killing that do not draw from the IHL
paradigm.147 Note, however, that even within the structure of
IHL, individual guilt may inform targeting decisions, provided it
does so for reasons that speak to considerations of military
necessity.148 If we suppose that Gunner is a notorious war
criminal, his targeting serves to prevent further abuses against
civilians and enemy combatants. Similarly, if Gunner is deeply
involved in the perpetration of an ongoing genocide, whose
prevention is the very cause of war, then targeting Gunner on
culpability-based criteria serves a preventive function that
directly advances the jus ad bellum. The critical distinction in
both cases, however, is that the targeting remains rooted in
preventive, rather than punitive, considerations.
The question of improper or mixed motives has obvious
salience to the context of terrorism, in which government officials
invoke IHL to justify the targeted killing of alleged combatants
who are simultaneously accused of serious crimes. It is partly on
account of this duality that the practice of targeted killing has
elicited so much controversy over whether IHL or law
enforcement is the correct legal paradigm. Our hypothetical
brings to light a limitation of the IHL paradigm that receives no
explicit attention in the law and is often overlooked in this
debate: an attack that is objectively justifiable under IHL may
nevertheless be impermissible because it is pursued for the wrong
reasons. At the same time, this limitation is complicated by the
pressing military considerations dictate that a machine gun be destroyed at
some point during a particular twenty-four-hour period. The machine gun is
continuously manned in shifts so that destroying the gun will also entail killing
a machine gunner, and personal grudges lead the gun to be destroyed during the
precise moment when Gunner is manning it. This example is more difficult
because we may assume that the officer would never have ordered Gunner’s
killing absent pressing military necessity. Nevertheless, improper motives
resolved the arbitrary question of precisely when to attack the machine gun.
147. See infra Parts III–IV (discussing the scope of permissible killing in
peacetime and discussing possible revisions to contemporary theory).
148. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 17, at 327 (addressing the difficulties of
placing targeted killings within the framework of either the IHL or law
enforcement).
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ambiguity that culpability-based targeting is sometimes justified
by the logic of IHL when rooted in preventive rather than
retributive considerations.
C. The War Paradigm and the bin Laden Killing
Although the hypothetical scenarios we have outlined do not
focus on terror cases, they highlight many of the issues that have
provoked controversy over targeted killing in recent years,
whether in the context of U.S. drone strikes in northwest
Pakistan and Yemen or the more recent raid on bin Laden’s
compound in Abbottabad. These cases demonstrate a trend
toward targeted killing away from the conventional battlefield of
named individuals who, in many cases, are also wanted for
serious crimes.
The bin Laden killing is, in some respects, an easier case
than it might have been. In authorizing the operation, President
Obama reportedly rejected Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s
recommendation to deploy a missile strike to obliterate the
suburban compound.149 Although doing so would have minimized
the risks to U.S. military personnel, the President was reportedly
uncomfortable with the risk to civilian lives and property that
would have resulted from deploying bombs of the required
intensity into the suburban area.150 Reports have also noted
uncertainty regarding whether bin Laden was, in fact, residing in
the compound, pointing out that a missile strike would not have
allowed the same positive identification of the target in the way
the Navy SEALs’ raid on the compound did.151
These considerations supply powerful moral and political
support to the President’s choice. Whether they reveal a legal
obligation to privilege a special-forces raid over less discriminate
149. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 38 (providing a detailed narrative of the
planning of and raid on Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound).
150. See id. (noting that the amount of explosives necessary to penetrate bin
Laden’s compound would have created “the equivalent of an earthquake” and
“[t]he prospect of flattening a Pakistani city made [President] Obama pause”).
151. See id. at 40 (reporting that the confidence among CIA analysts that
bin Laden was in the compound ranged from forty percent to ninety-five
percent).
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means under the circumstances raises a more difficult question
about the limits of IHL. Unlike our hypothetical machine gunner,
Osama bin Laden was a leadership figure of central importance,
whose targeting was a priority of U.S. military efforts for the last
decade.152 Although we have argued that cases of targeted killing
will frequently justify a stricter application of the proportionality
test, the possibility of incidental civilian losses in the pursuit of
important military objectives remains a core feature of IHL’s
permissive approach to killing.153 The general requirement to
discriminate between military and civilian objects, moreover, has
resisted the development of determinate standards dictating how
much personal risk combatants must assume in order to
minimize risk to civilians.154 Although we are inclined to agree
with those who argue that military planners should not assign
greater value to their own combatants’ lives than to those of
civilians, this is not an issue that is firmly resolved by existing
legal standards.155
It is tempting to argue that if the U.S. military would have
been justified in conducting a missile attack on the bin Laden
compound, then any less destructive method of killing the al
Qaeda leader would have also been permissible. We should be
glad, as some have argued, that the military did not simply
obliterate the Abbottabad compound but instead subjected U.S.
servicemen to substantial risk to protect civilian lives.156 We
should therefore avoid imposing additional legal requirements
that might deter similar humanitarian gestures. There is some
merit to this argument, but this line of thinking only goes so far.
152. See id. at 36 (stating that, after several previous failed attempts, the
Abbottabad raid was the team’s “first serious attempt since late 2001 at killing
[bin Laden]”).
153. See supra notes 126–33 and accompanying text (discussing the
proportionality requirement with respect to risk to civilians).
154. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (pointing out vagueness in
the proportionality requirement).
155. See Luban, supra note 135, at 12 (discussing the viability of the idea
that “soldiers must place higher value on their own civilians than on
themselves, but higher value on themselves than on enemy civilians”).
156. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that an airstrike would have
avoided the risk of “having American boots on the ground in Pakistan” and
lessened the risk to American soldiers).
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It is one thing to employ a means of attack, such as a remote
missile strike, which, if permissible, permits neither perfect
discrimination between combatants and civilians nor capture in
lieu of killing. But the justification for employing such means, if
legitimate, must be rooted in considerations of military
advantage, including some degree of force protection, and not in a
simple desire to kill rather than capture. The decision to
neutralize bin Laden by means of a raid complicates the picture
because, by electing to undertake a more discriminating and
risky operation, the military opened up the possibility of capture
in lieu of killing. The challenge, then, is to explain why the
commandos should remain free of any duty whatsoever to capture
short of bin Laden’s affirmative surrender.
This challenge is particularly acute in this case because the
mechanics of the operation—a raid on a residential compound in
an (at least nominally) allied state, and in an area that was not
otherwise the site of ongoing hostilities or of a hostile military
presence—resemble peacetime law enforcement so closely that it
is difficult to explain why considerations of military necessity
impose functional requirements distinct from those we associate
with law enforcement.
This is not to argue that the operation was illegal. Clearly,
the Navy SEALs who raided the Abbottabad compound faced
great risks in pursuing bin Laden, a fact that distinguishes their
situation from our hypothetical combatants who pursue Gunner
on vacation. As we discuss below, it is quite possible, depending
on the facts, that the use of lethal force was justified even if we
assume that traditional law-enforcement principles applied.157
We do not possess sufficient knowledge of the rules of
engagement or the facts on the ground to answer this question,
but surely even law-enforcement officials undertaking a
dangerous raid on a notorious terrorist’s well-guarded residential
compound will generally be justified in acting under the
assumption that they are under a constant threat, and the
decision to use lethal force must be understood with this in mind.
These considerations support arguments that the killing of
bin Laden was justified under either standard law-enforcement
157.

Infra Part VI.
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rules or under what we will describe below as a TK 2 case of
self-defense or defense of others. They do not explain, however,
why one should treat the operation as a TK 1 case, in which IHL
supplies more permissive rules of engagement than the rules
that would otherwise apply if one imagines, for example, that
Pakistan’s own police forces—acting on a tip from U.S.
intelligence officials—conducted the operation themselves. In
particular, these considerations do not support the blanket rule,
suggested by Koh’s public statements, that only affirmative
surrender would have triggered an obligation to take bin Laden
into custody.158 Like our hypothetical of Gunner on vacation, it
is hard to see how considerations of military necessity could
have supported the killing of bin Laden if capture would have
been feasible, if he was in fact manifestly defenseless, or if the
circumstances were such that one would demand that lawenforcement officials attempt capture.
Additionally, although we hesitate to speculate on the
accuracy or completeness of the picture provided by unofficial,
often anonymously sourced accounts, some media reports
provided a narrative that, if true, raises questions about
whether the rules of engagement were in fact consistent with
our reading of IHL. An August 2011 New Yorker article quoted
an anonymous special-operations officer, reportedly involved in
the operation, as stating, “[t]here was never any question of
detaining or capturing him—it wasn’t a split-second decision.
No one wanted detainees.”159 The same article also described bin
Laden’s killing as having taken place after Navy SEALs had
already killed every armed man in the compound, and
immediately after one serviceman undertook great personal risk
to clear a path to the al Qaeda leader by bear-hugging a woman
feared to be armed with explosives.160 The killing was then
succeeded by approximately thirty minutes of intelligencegathering, during which time surviving residents of the
158. See Koh, supra note 14 (“[C]onsistent with the laws of armed conflict
and U.S. military doctrine, the U.S. forces were prepared to capture bin Laden if
he had surrendered in a way that they could safely accept. . . . But where that is
not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal force . . . .”).
159. Schmidle, supra note 4, at 43.
160. Id. at 42–43.
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compound were bound and guarded.161 The special forces then
departed, taking bin Laden’s body with them.162 Although none
of these facts are legally conclusive in our view (assuming that
they provide an accurate picture), they do suggest that the
decision to kill bin Laden is more difficult to explain by
reference to potential sources of military advantage, such as a
desire to avoid personal risk or an inability to take detainees for
lack of resources or time.163
Finally, we maintain that avoiding detention is not itself a
justifiable reason to kill rather than capture under IHL.
Although one can credibly speak of advantages of avoiding the
burdens of detention and trial, and from precluding a
charismatic terrorist leader from exploiting the publicity of legal
process as a recruiting tool, these are not the sorts of benefits
embraced by the concept of military advantage, which focuses on
actions aimed at weakening the military forces of the enemy,
and not on the realization of broader political goals.164 A policy
to avoid trial on these grounds would also present irreconcilable
tensions with the due process guarantees afforded by IHL to
detainees accused of criminal offenses.165 These guarantees
affirm that the avoidance of due process is not the type of
military advantage that IHL generally privileges combatants to
pursue.

161. See id. at 43 (describing the cuffing of surviving residents and the
scouring of the compound).
162. See id. at 44 (describing how bin Laden’s body was given Muslim rites
and then heaved into the sea).
163. See id. at 43 (stating that bin Laden was found unarmed and could
have been taken alive if he had immediately surrendered).
164. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL I 61–68 (2009) (describing what military advantage entails with
respect to IHL).
165. See POW Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(d) (prohibiting “the passing
of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”).
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III. The Lawfulness of Targeted Killings Beyond War
A. A Typology of Cases

Thus far, we have focused on so-called TK 1 cases, in which
IHL is invoked to justify targeted killing. We now turn to cases
that do not rely on IHL. One case—call it TK 2—involves a
governmental actor instructed to kill an evildoer who is believed
to be planning an attack that would endanger the lives of many
innocent people. The government agent catches up to the evildoer
seconds before he detonates a bomb that will destroy a residential
building. The agent thwarts the attack by killing the evildoer. In
a sense, this case involves a targeted killing, for the government
named an individual beforehand as a target for killing.
Nevertheless, the case is uncontroversial because the killing is
clearly lawful under the domestic laws pertaining to defense of
self and others.166 Because killing the evildoer was necessary to
prevent an imminent attack against innocent people, the act is
obviously justified.167 For this reason, cases like TK 2 do not
trigger the sort of concerns that make the practice of targeted
killing morally and legally problematic.
A more interesting case—call it TK 3—arises when the agent
kills the evildoer before the attack commences. In some cases it
could be argued that such a killing is necessary to thwart a future
attack.168 However, the timing makes it unclear whether the act
is justified under the conventional understanding of defense of
self and others. Cases like TK 3 raise the problem of preemptive
or anticipatory self-defense.169 In these cases, the killing is
166. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (stating that the use of
force is justifiable if “immediately necessary” to protect against an attack).
167. Killings that thwart an imminent wrongful attack are clearly justified.
It is unclear, however, whether killings that thwart a non-imminent future
attack are justified. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From
Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 215 (2004) (discussing the
challenges to stringent imminence requirements in the law).
168. See id. at 224 (discussing the “complex” issues raised by anticipatory
self-defense in the international context).
169. See Amos N. Guiora, Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law:
A Re-Evaluation, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 3, 5 (2008) (proposing that
international law needs to be revised to allow for preemptive action against a
non-state actor, provided that sufficient intelligence is present).
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deemed necessary to prevent an attack that is neither imminent
nor ongoing but is certain to take place in the future.170 Even
though these cases are difficult to justify under the traditional
approach to the law of self-defense,171 more modern formulations
of the rules governing the use of force in protection of the person
seem to allow enough leeway to justify such acts, at least in some
circumstances.172 As a result, TK 3 cases are more controversial
than TK 2 cases, but the legality of such conduct can be justified
fairly easily by effecting some modifications in the traditional law
of self-defense.173
The more difficult and controversial case—call it TK 4—
arises when a named target, one who is believed to be dangerous
but who is not a member of enemy armed forces, is killed while
she is not engaging in an attack and when there is no knowledge
of a specific future attack that the target is planning, which can
only be prevented by use of lethal force. Arguably, this is the case
most reflective of the bin Laden killing.174 TK 4 cases are
170. See id. at 4 n.3 (positing that preemptive self-defense “allows for
reaction when a serious threat to national security exists,” but in doing so it
“expands the notion of imminence”).
171. These cases are difficult to justify under the traditional law of selfdefense because the deadly force is not used to prevent an imminent attack. This
is also the problem with providing a justification defense to battered women who
kill their abusers in nonconfrontational settings. See Joshua Dressler, Battered
Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 457,
461 (2006) (introducing the problem of the self-defense justification when the
domestic abuse is not imminent).
172. The Model Penal Code’s self-defense provision authorizes killings that
are “immediately necessary” to thwart a future attack even if the attack is not
yet imminent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985); see also Russell Christopher,
Imminence in Justified Targeted Killing, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND
MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 253, 256 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David
Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (“Some argue that targeted killings of
terrorists [representing continuous and ongoing threats of unlawful aggression]
do satisfy the imminence requirement.”).
173. See Guiora, supra note 169, at 5 (proposing a strict-scrutiny test that
would allow states to act in self-defense to prevent an attack).
174. As a result of the raid on bin Laden’s compound, U.S. officials
reportedly gained evidence of the al Qaeda leader’s involvement in multiple
terror plots, but reports do not indicate that officials viewed the raid as
necessary to prevent a particular, known attack. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti &
Scott Shane, Data From Raid Shows Bin Laden Plotted Attacks, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2011, at A1 (discussing documents taken from the Abbottabad
compound).
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problematic because the target does not meet the status-based
requirements of IHL, and, therefore, the killing cannot be
justified by appealing to the permissive rules governing the
targeting of combatants in wartime.175 These cases are also
difficult to justify under conventionally accepted accounts of
domestic criminal law defenses, given that it cannot be shown
that killing the person was necessary to prevent an ongoing or
future attack.176 As a result, TK 4 cases raise some of the most
challenging questions about the justifiability of targeted killings.
In the remainder of this Part, we consider the legality of
targeted killings under current understandings of the domestic
criminal law defenses of self-defense, lesser evils, and lawenforcement authority. Our discussion focuses on U.S. law and
precedents for illustrative purposes because each of these
defenses is consistent in definition and scope across most common
and civil law jurisdictions and finds support in international
human rights jurisprudence.177 Accordingly, we do not suggest
targeted killings taking place abroad are themselves subject to
U.S. criminal law. Moreover, while we examine the legality of TK
1, TK 2, and TK 3 scenarios, our primary emphasis is on the
potential justification of killing in TK 4 cases.
B. Targeted Killing as Traditional Defense of Self or Others
One way to argue for the legality of targeted killings is to
invoke the traditional law of self-defense or defense of others. It is
worth clarifying that we refer to the domestic law of self-defense
rather than to the international rule that authorizes countries to
resort to force in the exercise of so-called national self-defense.
Pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, states have
175. See supra Part II (discussing the treatment of targeted killings under
the conventions of jus ad bellum).
176. TK 4 cases are difficult to justify under both traditional and expansive
formulations of the law of defense of self and others. See Christopher, supra note
172, at 255 (stating that, because terrorists are not combatants, targeting them
for killing cannot be justified under the existing self-defense paradigms).
177. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 11, at 232 (summarizing the
circumstances, based on a review of international legal sources, in which lethal
force may be used).
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a right to use force in order to thwart an armed attack against
the nation.178 As we have already described, this right is the
source of much debate in ways critical to the legality of a
targeted-killing policy that crosses international borders. That
debate, however, is largely outside the scope of this Article
because it is principally concerned with breaches of state
sovereignty, rather than the rules pertaining to killing itself. Not
all cases, moreover, will implicate problems of state sovereignty.
A state, for example, may avoid sovereignty concerns by inviting
a foreign government onto its territory to carry out targeted
killings, but that consent does not make the killings themselves
legal.179
Domestic self-defense can sometimes succeed when the
international law of self-defense fails. It is plausible to imagine a
targeted killing that can be justified under the domestic law of
self-defense but cannot be justified under the international rules
governing the use of force. Imagine, for example, an intelligence
officer who is dispatched overseas to monitor a suspected
terrorist. Suppose that the officer kills the terrorist right before
the terrorist is to detonate a bomb inside a restaurant that will
kill several innocent people. Putting aside whether the officer is
otherwise legally present in the state, his actions do not implicate
the international rules governing the use of force. The killing of a
single individual in this manner does not rise to the level of an
“armed attack” under Article 51.180 At most, he might be guilty of
murder, but he is not in this case because the killing is easily
178. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . .”).
179. See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 268 (“While Yemen can consent
to another state entering its territory, . . . it cannot consent to that state
violating IHL or human rights law while there. Thus, some lawful justification
for the use of deadly force must still be identified.”).
180. See TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 378 (2010) (examining what
constitutes an “armed attack” in the context of modern warfare); Kirsten
Schmalenbach, The Right of Self-Defense and the ‘War on Terrorism’ One Year
After September 11, 3 GERMAN L.J. 63, 63 (2002), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=189
(noting
that under the traditional concept of Article 51, the armed attack has to be
“comparable to inter-state combat in its scale and effects”).
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justified under the domestic law of individual self-defense or
defense of others, which allows a person to kill an aggressor in
defense of self or others if he reasonably believes that killing the
aggressor is necessary in order to repel an imminent and
unlawful threat of death or serious bodily injury.181 The killing of
the terrorist thus amounts to a justifiable act of individual
defense of self or others as long as it was reasonable to believe
that the act was necessary to save the lives of third parties, which
it surely was.
The law of domestic self-defense is therefore well equipped to
deal with cases such as TK 2, in which an evildoer is killed just
before he engages in conduct that would endanger the lives of
others. Nevertheless, as we have already described, the domestic
law of self-defense cannot be invoked to justify targeted killings
in TK 3 cases, in which an evildoer is killed in order to prevent a
future but non-imminent attack—at least not as this body of law
has been understood traditionally. The conventionally accepted
account of the domestic law of self-defense authorizes killings
only when this course of action is believed to be necessary to repel
an unlawful and imminent threat.182 Therefore, assuming that
the evildoer is poised to engage in an attack that will take place
sometime in the next few days, weeks, or months, rather than
shortly after he is killed, his killing cannot be justified under the
traditional law of domestic self-defense. Such cases fall within
what criminal theorists call “preventive” self-defense, which,
although hotly debated, is almost universally recognized to fall
outside of the core of traditional justifiable self-defensive
action.183

181. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 2004) (stating that a
person may “use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he
or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself”); People v.
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986) (recognizing that self-defense permits the
use of deadly force when the actor reasonably believes use of such force is
necessary to repel an imminent attack).
182. See FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 64, at 90–91 (discussing how an
imminence requirement helps to distinguish self-defense from unlawful
preemptive attacks and punitive reprisals).
183. Id. at 162 (noting that preventative self-defense is analogous to
describing war as “politics by other means”).
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If domestic self-defense cannot legally justify killing in TK 3
cases, it a fortiori cannot justify killing in TK 4 cases, in which an
evildoer who does not pose an imminent threat is killed despite a
lack of specific knowledge of planned future attacks that would be
thwarted by the killing. The nonexistence of an imminent threat
is, once again, fatal to any purported claim of justification under
the domestic law of self-defense in these types of cases. As a
result, the laws of individual self-defense are useful only in
justifying targeted killings in easy cases, in which no one but the
most radical pacifist would oppose the use of force. The laws of
individual self-defense fail to justify targeted killings in the more
complicated TK 3 and TK 4 scenarios.
C. Targeted Killing as Expanded Defense of Self or Others
If the most controversial aspects of the practice of targeted
killings cannot be legally justified by appealing to the traditional
formulation of the law of self-defense, perhaps a more modern
and expanded version of self-defense can better justify these acts.
Common reformulations start by arguing that the concurrence of
an “imminent attack” should not be considered amongst the
conditions that trigger the justifiable use of deadly force against
another.184
Why do some scholars argue in favor of abandoning the
imminence requirement? One reason is that there are situations
in which it seems the only way of repelling a future deadly attack
is to use force in a nonconfrontational situation before the attack
becomes imminent.185 These cases present a conflict between
necessity and imminence.186 For Jane to save her own life, it
might be necessary to kill Bill when he is not attacking her. If she
184. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 172, at 255 (asserting that the
imminence requirement, which “bars targeted killing of terrorists, should be
rejected”).
185. See, e.g., FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 64, at 163 (“Suppose a terrorist
threatens to implant an undetectable nuclear device that is set to explode in a
year. He can be stopped now, but once the device is implanted, it will be too
late.”).
186. For a lucid discussion of the tensions between imminence and
necessity, see Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who
Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380 (1993).
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waits for an attack, she stands no chance. If the necessity of using
force is deemed to be more important than the concurrence of an
imminent attack, then Jane’s preemptive strike ought to be
justified. If, on the contrary, imminence trumps necessity, then
Jane’s anticipatory use of force should not be justified.
The debate is of significant practical importance in battered
women cases, in which wives defend the killing of their husbands
in nonconfrontational situations, such as when their husbands
are asleep, on the ground that waiting until the attack became
imminent would have prevented the wives from successfully
curbing the future attack that the husbands would have surely
launched.187 Normally, of course, one would demand that the
victim call the authorities to prevent a non-imminent attack, but
in some cases the battered spouse has reached out to authorities
to no avail, indicating that authorities are unwilling or unable to
help her.188
There are many who argue that in such cases the traditional
law of self-defense should give way, the imminence requirement
should be relaxed or abandoned, and the emphasis should be
placed on whether or not the use of force is necessary to prevent
the future attack.189 There are also many staunch supporters of
the imminence requirement who oppose such an expansion of
self-defense law.190 Regardless of which of these views is more
187. This is the issue presented in the well–known case of State v. Norman.
See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989) (concluding that a woman who
had been physically and mentally abused by her husband over period of several
years, and who had been diagnosed as suffering from battered woman’s
syndrome, was not acting in self-defense when, in order to prevent future abuse,
she shot her husband while he slept). Much ink has been spilled analyzing the
issues raised by Norman. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 171, at 458 (suggesting
that expanding self-defense to include nonconfrontational homicide would be a
mistake); Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and the Battered
Woman, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 342, 343 (2007) (arguing that the imminence rule
is an essential element of the law of self-defense and should not be modified).
188. See Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (stating that a police officer told the wife
that “he could do nothing for her unless she took out a warrant on her husband”
and left, even after the wife said that “if she [took out a warrant], her husband
would kill her”).
189. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 186, at 380 (“If action is really necessary to
avert a threatened harm, society should allow the action, or at least not punish
it, even if the harm is not imminent.”).
190. See, e.g., Ferzan, supra note 167, at 217 (positing that “imminence
serves as the actus reus for aggression, separating those threats that we may
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normatively appealing, it is worth noting that the more modern
and expansive account of self-defense is slowly but surely gaining
supporters. The Model Penal Code’s formulation of the defense
rejects the imminent-attack limitation on the use of force in
defense of self or others, and instead includes the more lenient
and necessity-based requirement that the force be immediately
necessary to repel an unlawful aggression.191 Assuming, for the
sake of argument, that this position is correct, can it serve to
justify targeted killings in the more interesting and complicated
cases discussed here?
For starters, an expanded version of self-defense that does
away with the imminence requirement fares better in justifying
TK 3 cases than the traditional imminence-based account of selfdefense. In such scenarios, much like in certain battered-women
cases,192 deadly force is used to prevent a near certain future
attack, and waiting until the future aggression becomes
imminent will significantly reduce or even eliminate the
defender’s chance of successfully warding off the aggression. As
long as the use of such force is the only way of thwarting the
future attack, the absence of imminence does not preclude a
finding of legal justification under the more expansive necessitybased account of self-defense.193 This is precisely the argument
recently put forth by Russell Christopher as a possible
justification for targeted killings.194 Building primarily on what
properly defend against from mere inchoate and potential threats” and it
therefore “is independent of the needs of the defender”).
191. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1985) (“The use of deadly force is
not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is
necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat . . . .”).
192. See, e.g., Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 9 (concluding that a woman who
suffered from battered woman’s syndrome was not acting in self-defense when
she shot her husband while he slept in order to prevent future abuse); see also
Dressler, supra note 171, at 459–61 (detailing the constant verbal and physical
abuse that Judy Norman endured from her husband and discussing whether
Mrs. Norman was justified in killing her husband despite the lack of an
imminent attack).
193. See Rosen, supra note 186, at 404–07 (discussing the viability of a selfdefense statute without an imminence requirement).
194. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing how the
imminence requirement is becoming easier to satisfy).
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others before him have argued in the context of battered-women
cases, Christopher argues that the absence of an imminent attack
need not be fatal to the claim that targeted killings ought to be
justified under the rubric of self-defense.195
What Christopher does not do, however, is explain whether
this expanded version of self-defense can account for the legality
of TK 4 cases. Unfortunately for those who believe that targeted
killing can be justified even in some TK 4 cases, the paradigm of
expanded self-defense is inadequate. The problem is that TK 4
cases involve killing an individual who is believed to be
dangerous, without any degree of certainty about whether doing
so is necessary to prevent a future attack. Although in such cases
the agent has knowledge that the evildoer is dangerous and that,
in light of his past acts, he will likely attack again in the future,
there is no concrete evidence of specific future attacks that can
only be prevented by killing him. An expanded version of selfdefense would thus fail to justify such killings because the
essential element of the defense—that the use of force be
necessary to prevent the death or serious bodily injury of third
parties—is missing.
D. Targeted Killing as Law-Enforcement Action
Claire Finkelstein has suggested that some targeted killings
might be legally justified by appealing to the rules governing the
use of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement authority.196 In
particular, Finkelstein contends that law-enforcement authority
can justify targeted killings that are not justified by the law of
defense of self or others.197 Can law-enforcement authority justify
195. See Christopher, supra note 172, at 284 (concluding that “[t]he
imminence requirement for justified self-defense is problematic and should be
abandoned”).
196. See Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as Preemptive Action, in
TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 156, 178–79
(Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (arguing
that “there is justification for the use of force . . . as applied to a targeted killing
situation” and that the justification is “most clearly demonstrated by certain
domestic law enforcement circumstances”).
197. See id. at 179 (considering the reach of law-enforcement authority in
cases in which the standard justifications are inapplicable).
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these more controversial cases? It depends on the scope of the
rules governing law-enforcement authority, an issue that
Finkelstein unfortunately does not address in much detail.
U.S. legal history demonstrates the complexity of the issue.
At early common law, deadly force could be used by lawenforcement agents to arrest a fleeing felon.198 The right to use
such force was quite expansive because its use was not
conditioned on whether the fleeing felon posed a danger to the
officer or to third parties.199 Deadly force could also be used to
prevent the commission of a felony.200 This expansive view of lawenforcement authority subsequently eroded in many states,
either by statute or case law.201 Presently, many, if not most,
states limit the use of deadly force by government officials to the
prevention of violent felonies.202 The Model Penal Code adopted a
similar limit on the use of deadly force by law-enforcement
officers, which is authorized pursuant to Section 3.07 if the crime
for which the arrest is made involved the use or threatened use of
deadly force.203
Although the common law rules are fairly clear and easy to
apply, the U.S. Supreme Court complicated matters when it
held that the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
seizures placed constitutional limits on the amount of force that
a police officer may use to make an arrest.204 In Tennessee v.
198. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 21.03 (6th ed.
2012) (discussing the rules governing use of deadly force at common law).
199. See id. (noting that the common law crime-prevention defense “is
remarkably broad in that it authorizes use of necessary deadly force to prevent
nonviolent felonies”).
200. See id. (explaining that deadly force at common law is justified if the
user of force reasonably believes such other person is committing a felony).
201. Id.; see also, e.g., People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241, 245 (Cal. 1974)
(adopting the common law rule that the use of deadly force to prevent a felony is
justifiable only if the offense is a “forcible and atrocious crime”).
202. DRESSLER, supra note 198.
203. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b) (1981) (explaining that deadly force
is not justified unless the actor believes “the crime for which the arrest is made
involve[s] conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly force”). There
are additional requirements that must be met under § 3.07 before deadly force
by law enforcement is authorized. See id. § 3.07 (listing the requisite elements
that justify use of deadly force).
204. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (rejecting the
argument that, as long as there is probable cause to warrant an arrest, the
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Garner,205 the Court held that the killing of a fleeing unarmed
youth suspected of committing a nonviolent felony amounted to
an unreasonable seizure that ran afoul of the Fourth
Amendment.206 Subsequently, the Court held in Scott v. Harris207
that the police could use deadly force by ramming a fleeing
driver’s car from behind because the driver’s reckless conduct
could have jeopardized the life or limb of other motorists.208 It is
unclear whether these cases impose additional limits on the use
of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement authority, beyond
the ones statutorily in place in most states today.209
Regardless of whether the U.S. Constitution imposes
additional limitations on the use of deadly force by governmental
agents, it is fairly obvious that police officers may sometimes use
more force than private citizens would be allowed to employ
pursuant to the law of self-defense and defense of others. The
facts of Harris constitute a case in point. The police officers in
Harris were allowed to use deadly force against the fleeing
motorist even though the motorist was not endangering the life or
limb of third parties at the time force was used.210 While the
driver’s conduct was reckless and dangerous in the abstract (it
could have endangered someone had someone been there), there
was no evidence that the life or bodily integrity of another
motorist was in imminent danger at the moment the police
Fourth Amendment has no role in determining how an arrest is made).
205. See id. at 22 (holding that an officer’s use of lethal force without
adequate physical threat of harm was unconstitutional).
206. See id. at 20–21 (stating that the officer did not have probable cause to
believe the suspect posed any physical danger).
207. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (“A police officer’s attempt
to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of
innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”).
208. See id. at 383–84 (balancing the extent of the intrusion on the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests against the government’s interests
and finding that the latter prevails because of the number of innocent lives at
risk).
209. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 13–19 (considering the
common law rule and the history of other jurisdictions’ rules).
210. See id. at 384–86 (finding that the Fourth Amendment did not prevent
the police officers from using deadly force against a fleeing motorist who had not
definitively placed any lives in imminent danger).
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rammed the driver’s car.211 The reasonable possibility of future
harm that might be caused by the motorist seemed to be
sufficient to justify using deadly force. Such reasonable
probability of future harm would not be enough to trigger the
imminence requirement in self-defense.
Applied to targeted killings, the rules governing the use of
deadly force by law-enforcement officers could authorize using
deadly force against the evildoer if he is fleeing. In many
targeted-killing cases, the person targeted is suspected of
criminal responsibility for grave atrocities, which would satisfy
the violent-felony requirement, assuming the accusations can be
substantiated. The problem, however, is that law-enforcement
authority justifies the use of deadly force only to prevent a felon
from escaping or to thwart the imminent commission of a violent
felony.212 In TK 4 cases (as well as in many TK 3 cases), however,
the person targeted is not fleeing and might not even be aware
that the agent is targeting him.213 Also, the targeted individual in
these cases is not about to commit a crime when he is targeted.
Therefore, the version of law-enforcement authority that has
prevailed in domestic law cannot justify using force in the more
complicated and controversial TK 4 cases unless the targeted
suspect is fleeing or about to commit a crime.
E. Targeted Killings as Necessity or Lesser Evils
Perhaps some targeted killings can be justified as cases of
necessity or lesser evils. Under the Model Penal Code, an actor is
entitled to a lesser-evils or necessity justification if she inflicts an
evil in order to prevent an even greater evil.214 Thus, the person
211. See id. at 384 (acknowledging that there was a less than certain
probability that the defendant’s actions would cause death).
212. See DRESSLER, supra note 198, § 21.03 (explaining the circumstances in
which deadly force is permissible under the modern majority rule).
213. This would almost always be the case when the targeted killing is
carried out by way of an aerial strike. For obvious reasons, most targeted
individuals will not be aware of the fact that they are about to be killed by a
missile or a drone strike.
214. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1985) (providing that conduct one
believes to be necessary to avoid harm to oneself or another is justifiable if “the
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to
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who breaks a car window without the owner’s consent in order to
save a child who is suffocating inside the car acts justifiably
pursuant to the lesser-evils defense. Although her conduct
nominally satisfies the elements of the offense of criminal
mischief,215 it is not considered wrongful because the evil
prevented by the act (the death of a child) is greater than the evil
inflicted (damage to the property). Similarly, it could be argued
that killing the targeted individual may sometimes be justified
because doing so prevents the occurrence of some greater harm.
Perhaps, for example, by killing the target, one can foil the
target’s plot to bomb a residential building. Doing so would save
dozens or hundreds of people by killing one. Although it is
controversial whether one can ever kill a person in order to save
other people in circumstances other than self-defense or lawenforcement authority,216 many have argued that such killings
ought to be justified if the amount of people saved by the conduct
is considerable.
Fernando Tesón has recently defended some targeted killings
by appealing to a logic similar to the one undergirding the lesserevils justification.217 More specifically, he argues that it might
sometimes be justified to engage in the targeted killing of an evil
be prevented by the law defining the offense charged”). For the defense to
succeed, there must also be no statutory exceptions relevant to the specific facts
involved, and there must be no apparent legislative purpose preventing the
situation from being deemed justifiable. Id. § 3.02(1)(b)–(c).
215. The Texas Penal Code is representative of a criminal-mischief statute,
stating that the offense is committed when a person “intentionally or knowingly
damages or destroys the tangible property of the owner.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 28.03(a)(1) (2009). This is one of three ways in which criminal mischief can be
committed in Texas. See id. § 28.03(a)(2)–(3) (providing for an offense if one
causes pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to another or makes
markings on the tangible property of another).
216. The German Federal Constitutional Court struck down a law
authorizing the government to shoot down a plane headed toward a heavily
populated area, ruling that the state does not have a right to take innocent life
even if doing so is the only way of saving hundreds of people.
Bundesvergfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15,
2006, 1 BVR 357/05, ¶ 137, 2006 (Ger.). According to the Court, authorizing such
action would violate the dignity of the passengers inside the plane, for they
would be treated as fungible objects that can be killed as long as more lives are
saved than destroyed. Id. ¶ 34.
217. See Tesón, supra note 93, at 405, 411 (discussing the narrow
circumstances in which he asserts that targeted killings are not immoral).
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ruler or a terrorist if doing so prevents him from killing hundreds
or thousands of people.218 It is important to note that Tesón’s
proposal justifies the targeted killing only if engaging in such
tactics is the only way to prevent the en masse killing of human
beings.219 According to Tesón, this means that, in the sui generis
context of terrorism, “the state reasonably knows that acting now
may be its only chance to avert a terrorist strike.”220
Tesón’s proposal illustrates how and when the lesser-evils
defense can be invoked to justify targeted killings. Although
Tesón’s argument is plausible, it has at least two limitations for
purposes of our analysis. First, and taking into account that
Tesón does not impose an imminence requirement, it is unclear
whether his justification for targeted killings is any different
from the expanded defense of self or others justification that we
have already described. If killing the target now is the only way
to thwart a future threat to innocent lives, it would seem that
engaging in such conduct would also be justified under the
expanded concept of self-defense. Perhaps the most important
contribution of this proposal, therefore, is its novel approach to
the international-relations dimension of targeted killing: the
ability to save a substantial number of lives may explain why a
particular state may violate the territorial integrity of another
state to carry out the killing.
Second, and more importantly, Tesón’s proposal cannot
justify killings in TK 4 scenarios, for it is the nature of such cases
that it is not known with any certainty whether the targeted
individual was about to launch an attack. Although it is
reasonable to believe that the individuals targeted in cases like
TK 4 could help plan or launch future attacks, there is no
concrete evidence about specific plans that can only be thwarted
by killing the person. This is why it is difficult, if not impossible,
to invoke traditional lesser-evils principles to justify targeted
killings in TK 4 scenarios. Given that the government official in
218. See id. at 423 (proposing that targeted killing of terrorists in a
peacetime setting is permissible “only when necessary to prevent the deaths of a
substantial number of innocent persons”).
219. See id. (explaining that it must be impossible or prohibitive to capture
the target for a targeted killing to be justified).
220. Id. at 427.
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such cases is unaware of any specific future (and reasonably
imminent) attacks that would be foiled by killing the target, it
cannot be said with any reasonable degree of certainty that
killing the individual is indeed the only way to prevent the killing
of innocent human beings in the future.
IV. Another Paradigm for Targeted Killings? The Killing of Pablo
Escobar
Pablo Escobar was one of the most infamous criminals of the
late twentieth century.221 Escobar was the head of the “Cartel de
Medellín,” Colombia’s largest and most feared criminal
organization.222 At its zenith, the Cartel de Medellín was one of
the most successful and sprawling criminal organizations of all
time, smuggling tons of cocaine into the United States on a
weekly basis.223
Escobar kept his grip on power by employing a double
strategy. First, he would create a loyal following amongst many
people living in dire poverty, especially in his hometown of
Medellín and, more generally, in the province of Antioquia.224 He
did this by building housing complexes for the poor, helping the
needy, and performing other charitable acts, such as building
soccer fields with lighting so that workers could play at night.225
Although Escobar tried to get these sectors of the population to
love him, he simultaneously attempted to get governmental
221. See MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO: THE HUNT FOR THE WORLD’S
GREATEST OUTLAW 59 (2001) (noting that, by 1989, Escobar was “one of the
richest men in the world, and perhaps its most infamous criminal”). At least ten
books have been written about Pablo Escobar, including books written by his
accountant, some of his lovers, and some of his coconspirators. See, e.g.,
ROBERTO ESCOBAR & DAVID FISHER, THE ACCOUNTANT’S STORY: INSIDE THE
VIOLENT WORLD OF THE MEDELLÍN CARTEL, at inside cover (2009) (stating that
Pablo Escobar’s brother, Roberto Escobar, is the author of the book and was the
top accountant for the Medellín Cartel).
222. At one time, Escobar’s Cartel “dominated the cocaine traffic through
Colombia to the United States.” Death of a Cocaine King, BALT. SUN, Dec. 4,
1993, at 8A.
223. ESCOBAR & FISHER, supra note 221, at viii.
224. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 28–29 (noting that Escobar was one of
Medellín’s largest employers and spent millions of dollars improving the city).
225. Id. at 29.
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actors to fear him.226 He did this by implementing, with ruthless
efficiency, his infamous policy colloquially known as “plata o
plomo.”227 Translated literally, the phrase means “silver or
lead,”228 which meant that one would either have to accept bribes
to allow Escobar to continue his business or face the bullet fire
that would ensue if one refused to do so.229 The policy was a huge
success for Escobar, as he was able to bribe most government
officials who could have gotten in his way.230 Those who could not
be bribed were often killed.231 There is even evidence that he
managed to kill a popular presidential candidate who had
publicly vowed to go after Escobar with all of the government’s
might.232 When such strategies failed to work, it is believed that
Escobar would resort to even more sinister means, including
terroristic strategies such as suicide and commercial-aircraft
bombings.233 Some have even suggested that Escobar was
involved in the murder of nearly half of the justices of the
Colombian Supreme Court, carried out by guerillas from the 19th
of April Movement.234
226. See id. at 24–29 (describing citizens’ love for Escobar and government
officials’ fear of him).
227. Id. at 24.
228. See id. (providing the English translation of the phrase).
229. See id. (“One either accepted [Escobar’s] plata (silver) or his plomo
(lead).”).
230. See, e.g., id. at 52 (detailing Escobar’s bribes of the Columbia Attorney
General and judiciary).
231. At least 228 judges and court officers were killed during the 1980s.
Steven Gutkin, Colombia Trying to Repair Judicial System Battered by
Organized Crime, TIMES-NEWS (Hendersonville, N.C.), Jan. 10, 1991, at 25.
232. See Brian Byrnes, Sins of the Father, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 12, 2009,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/11/12/sins-of-the-father.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (stating that Escobar ordered the death of presidential
candidate Luis Carlos Galàn) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
233. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 80–81 (describing an airline bombing
plot ordered by Escobar). Escobar was implicated in the downing of an Avianca
airliner in an unsuccessful effort to kill then-presidential-hopeful César Gaviria.
Id. at 59.
234. See id. at 52–53 (discussing Escobar’s targeting of Colombia’s judicial
system in the 1980s). The 19th of April Movement—known in Colombia as the
M-19—was a Colombian guerrilla group that operated in the 1970s and 1980s.
STEPHEN E. ATKINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN WORLDWIDE EXTREMISTS AND
EXTREMIST GROUPS 185 (2004).
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Eventually, Escobar decided to strike a deal with Colombian
authorities in order to avoid extradition to the United States,
where he was wanted for various drug-related offenses.235 The
terms of the deal were quite favorable to Escobar. He would
surrender only if the government agreed to give him a lenient
sentence and to not extradite him.236 Escobar also demanded that
he serve his prison time in a facility that he himself would build
for the purposes of serving his sentence.237 He was eventually
sentenced to five years of imprisonment and was allowed to serve
his sentence in the facility he built, which came to be known as
“La Catedral” (meaning “The Cathedral”).238 More Ritz Carlton
than San Quentin, La Catedral was essentially a mansion
equipped with a discotheque, gym, “dirt bike track,” and several
“chalets” for entertaining his female friends.239 His pseudoimprisonment did not stop his drug dealings, as he was able to
surround himself with “prison guards” who were loyal to him and
allowed him to meet with clients and continue managing his
criminal enterprise.240
A little over a year after his sentence, Escobar murdered a
pair of subordinates whom he believed to be disloyal to him.241
This was the impetus for then-President of Colombia César
Gaviria to order the transfer of Escobar to a real correctional
facility.242 Unfortunately for the government, Escobar was able to

235. See, e.g., U.S. Charges Escobar for Jetliner Bombing, WILLIAMSON DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 14, 1992, at 17.
236. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 96–97 (describing Escobar’s deal with
the Colombian government to avoid extradition to the United States).
237. See Prison Prepares to Welcome Drug Billionaire, TORONTO STAR, June
16, 1991, at H3 (noting that Escobar “could equip the room as he wished,” which
would be “no problem” considering his “personal fortune of $3 billion”).
238. See id. (referring to the location from which the article was reported as
“La Catedral, Columbia”).
239. DOMINIC STREATFEILD, COCAINE: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 444
(2001).
240. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 110 (“The prison guards were no more
than Pablo’s employees . . . .”).
241. See id. at 118 (describing how Escobar had two of his “powerful
lieutenants” killed because he was “[s]uspicious . . . of their loyalty”).
242. See id. at 120 (describing President Gaviria’s decision, after the
killings, to move Escobar “to a real prison”).
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learn of the plan beforehand.243 Although the prison was
surrounded by “an entire brigade of the Colombian army, roughly
four hundred men,” Escobar managed to escape unharmed.244
A. Killing Escobar
Escobar’s escape from La Catedral was the last straw for the
Colombian government. With full knowledge that capturing
Escobar would require more training and resources than those
that Colombia could offer at the time, the government turned to
the United States for help.245 The same year that Escobar escaped
from his prison hotel, agents from the United States’ elite combat
team, Delta Force, started training and advising the Colombian
police and military.246 This led to the creation of the “Bloque de
Búsqueda” (Search Bloc),247 a Colombian police force trained and
assisted by Delta Force that was tasked with finding and
capturing Escobar.248 Commanded by Colonel Hugo Martínez,
members of the Search Bloc were meticulously screened to ferret
out any prospective agent that might be susceptible to corruption,
or who might already be working as a spy for Escobar.249 The
Search Bloc was also assisted by a U.S. Army special unit known
as Centra Spike250 and American planes, which provided vital
243. See id. at 123 (“[B]ecause of radio and TV reports, Escobar . . . knew
that armed forces were massing around his prison. Any hope of surprise was
gone.”).
244. Id. at 134.
245. See id. at 140 (noting that, in seeking help from the United States,
Gavaria had “opened the door to anything”).
246. See id. at 141–42 (describing U.S. officials’ deliberations, and ultimate
decision, to use Delta Force to track down Escobar in Colombia).
247. Id. at 66.
248. See Inquiry Details U.S. Role in Killing of Drug Lord, LAKELAND
LEDGER, Nov. 12, 2000, at A5 (noting the involvement of the Delta Force in the
Escobar operation and that “U.S. officials . . . acknowledged training the Search
Bloc”).
249. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 67 (noting that officers on the Search
Bloc could not be “native Antioquian[s]” from Escobar’s home town and that the
men chosen were “considered elite and incorruptible”).
250. See id. at 73 (describing Centra Spike and its purpose); Mark Bowden,
Quietly, Search Bloc Pins Escobar Down, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 14, 2000, at A2
(noting that “American surveillance experts at Centra Spike” worked with the
Search Bloc to locate Escobar).
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intelligence that proved decisive in tracking down Escobar.251 The
United States agreed to provide all of this help pursuant to
President Reagan’s 1986 order that declared drug trafficking to
be a threat to the national security of the country, and thus
authorized the use of military assets to assist police forces in
neutralizing the threat.252
While the Search Bloc was hunting Escobar down, a vigilante
group—financed both by Escobar’s enemies in the drug world and
by right-wing paramilitaries—began a bloody campaign designed
to weaken Escobar by killing his closest associates and relatives
and to exact vengeance for what he had done to them and the
country.253 The group called themselves “Los Pepes,” which stood
for “Los Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar” (People Persecuted by
Pablo Escobar).254 Los Pepes were almost as ruthless as Escobar,
often employing the same tactics that Escobar used to terrorize
his enemies.255 The group would achieve its objective by any
means necessary, including planting bombs, setting fire to
Escobar’s property, and murdering many of his lawyers, bankers,
and extended family.256 There is also much evidence suggesting
that there was some collaboration between the Search Bloc and
Los Pepes and, indirectly, between the American military and
Los Pepes.257 While there is no direct evidence linking the Search
251. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 154 (noting the volume of U.S. military
aircraft monitoring Escobar’s activity over Medellín).
252. See id. at 54 (noting that National Security Decision Directive 221,
signed in 1986, “opened the door to direct [U.S.] military involvement in the war
on drugs”).
253. See id. at 176–77 (describing Los Pepes, a group committed to
retaliating against Escobar and his associates); Los Pepes: Sed de Venganza, EL
TIEMPO, Dec. 2, 1993, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-278283
(last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (describing Los Pepes and their retaliation efforts)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
254. BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 176.
255. See id. (“If [Escobar] stood atop an organizational mountain that
consisted of family, bankers, sicarios, and lawyers, then perhaps the only way to
get him was to take down the mountain.”).
256. See id. at 191–95 (listing Escobar’s associates that were targets in the
“bloodbath”).
257. See Mark Bowden, U.S. Spy Data, Vigilante Killings Start to Coincide,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 1, 2000, http://articles.philly.com/2000-12-01/news/
25579871_1_escobar-vigilante-squad-los-pepes (last visited Sept. 24, 2012)
(stating that “[m]ore and more of the people identified by Centra Spike’s
Beechcraft spy planes were turning up dead” in killings orchestrated by Los
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Bloc and the American military to the perpetration of the crimes
committed by Los Pepes, some have suggested that both the
United States and the Colombian government tolerated the
actions carried out by Los Pepes, albeit never expressly approving
of them.258
Slowly but surely, the combined pressure exerted by the
Search Bloc and Los Pepes wore Escobar down. By 1993, he was
constantly on the run and feared not only that the Search Bloc
would catch up to him, but also that Los Pepes would kill his wife
and children.259 On December 2, 1993, the Search Bloc located
Escobar using radio triangulation technology provided by the
United States.260 After the Search Bloc stormed the Medellín
house in which Escobar was hiding, Escobar opened fire.261
Realizing that he was outnumbered and outgunned, Escobar
jumped out of a window and started running across the roofs of
surrounding houses in a desperate attempt to escape.262 Members
of the Search Bloc shot and killed Escobar on the spot.263 He was
shot three times: once in the leg, once in the torso, and a fatal
shot in his ear.264 Although the exact circumstances of his death
are unknown, it is widely believed that Escobar was executed by
the police, as there is evidence tending to demonstrate that the
fatal shot was fired after Escobar was already neutralized by the
Search Bloc.265
Pepes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
258. See id. (noting that “[i]f Los Pepes were working with the Search Bloc,
that would explain their apparent access to fresh U.S. intelligence” but that any
evidence of “American linkage with Los Pepes remained circumstantial” at
best).
259. See Escobar on Run from Vigilante Attacks, TOLEDO BLADE, Feb. 28,
1993, at D5 (noting that Escobar was “on the run and getting what he dishes
out” from Los Pepes, who recently bombed the homes of his “family members”).
260. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 239–43 (describing the details of
locating Escobar with radio triangulation).
261. See Drug Lord Escobar Killed in Shootout, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Dec.
3, 1993, at 1A, 19A (describing the Search Bloc’s raid and ensuing shootout at
Escobar’s home in Medellín).
262. BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 248.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 253.
265. See id. (opining that “[t]he shots to his leg and back most likely would
have knocked him down, but probably would not have killed him,” thus making
it more likely that Escobar was “shot in the head after [he] fell”).
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B. Domestic and International Reaction to Escobar’s Killing
Most Colombians received the news of Escobar’s death with
jubilation.266 His demise marked an important milestone for the
country. The government was finally able to triumph over the
“biggest and baddest” drug lord the world had ever seen. Stifling
the Medellín Cartel was a first win in a series of victories over the
country’s cartels and thugs. The government focused on
dismantling Escobar’s rivals, especially the Cali Cartel, and
Colombia embarked on its slow but steady journey to regain
control over the country.267 First would come the drug cartels and
then the infamous FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
Colombianas) guerillas.268 Although we do not wish to exaggerate
the significance of this single event, Escobar’s death played an
important role in Colombia’s resolution of its security problems.
Today, the country is characterized by optimism in the fight
against drug-smuggling and guerillas. There is also cautious
optimism about the economic growth that goes hand-in-hand with
the political stability that such victories bring. In recent years,
Colombia has been doing well economically and politically by
Latin-American standards.269 Drug- and guerilla-related violence
is down dramatically from 1990 levels.270 All in all, Colombia is
266. See id. at 261 (“[T]his day was for celebration.”); see also, e.g., Al Fin
Cayó Escobar!, EL TIEMPO, Dec. 31, 1993, http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/
documento/MAM-282510 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (breaking news that
Escobar was killed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
267. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 272 (discussing the unraveling of the
Cali cartel).
268. See TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY, GUERRILLAS AND REVOLUTION IN
LATIN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSURGENTS AND REGIMES SINCE 1956,
at 17–18 (1992) (explaining that many disgruntled Columbians formed FARC,
the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, due to a government military
campaign to quell “quasi-independent zones” of Columbian farmers formed for
“self-defense and self-administration in agrarian matters”).
269. See Stephen Manker, Colombia’s Economic Growth to be 3rd Strongest
in Region for 2011: IMF, COLUMBIA REPORTS, June 17, 2011,
http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/economy/17058-colombias-economicgrowth-to-be-3rd-strongest-in-region-for-2011-imf.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2012) (stating that Colombia’s economic growth was approximately 5% in the
first quarter of 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
270. See Enrique S. Pumar, Colombian Immigrants, in MULTICULTURAL
AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEWEST AMERICANS 353, 371–72 (Ronald H.
Bayor ed., 2011) (finding that the Colombian government has become regarded

BEYOND WAR

1441

now a relatively safe country.271 Escobar’s death was an
important component of this recovery.
This is not to say, of course, that Colombia has solved all of
its problems. The guerrillas retain control over a small portion of
the country, and drug violence is still a problem.272 Nonetheless,
Colombia is undeniably a safer, less violent country than it was
twenty years ago.273 This is due, at least in part, to the
government’s dismantling of the Medellín cartel, including its
killing of Escobar.
Perhaps the most important consequence of Escobar’s death
was that it proved to the government and to Colombians that
they were capable of defeating serious threats to their national
security. The Search Bloc was so effective in tracking down
Escobar that it was used as a model for other operations carried
out by the government. Subsequent Search Blocs were successful
in dismantling most of the remaining drug cartels in the
country.274 The victory over Escobar also proved to be
determinative of Colombian–U.S. relationships. The strong ties
that developed between the two countries continue to thrive to
this day. The United States has also learned from Colombia’s
struggle against terrorism and organized crime. After all—as

as “a strong democracy with an improving economy and reduced levels of
violence” since it began receiving aid from the United States in the year 2000 to
deal “with the ramifications of civil strife fueled by drug money”).
271. See id. at 372 (describing the reduced levels of violence in Colombia).
272. See, e.g., Colombia’s Defense Minister Steps Down, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug.
31, 2011, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2016065962_aplt
colombiadefenseminister.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (noting that the
recent “rise in guerrilla attacks” is fueled by drug trafficking conflicts) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
273. See, e.g., Vicky Baker, Bogotá’s Age of Rediscovery, GUARDIAN, Aug. 19,
2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/travel/2011/aug/19/bogota-colombia-city-restau
rants (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (“Bogotá’s landscape is changing rapidly.
People who abandoned its centre . . . at the height of internal conflict in the
1990s are coming back.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
274. See Mark Peceny & Michael Durnan, The FARC’s Best Friend: U.S.
Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia’s Civil War in the 1990s, 48
LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 95, 105–06 (2006) (noting that the Colombian
government, responding to pressures from the U.S. government, “[l]aunch[ed]
an all-out campaign to capture the [Cali] cartel’s leaders,” which led to its defeat
by the end of 1995).
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others have pointed out—the Colombian experience helped the
United States formulate its post-9/11 counterterrorism policies.275
In spite of the widespread jubilation with which the news of
Escobar’s death was received in the country, some Colombians
were saddened when they learned about his killing.276 For some,
Escobar was a modern day Robin Hood who took from the
government and the corrupt rich people and gave back to the
poor. This was especially the case in some barrios277 of Escobar’s
hometown of Medellín.278 These were the same people who knew
of his whereabouts and never said a word to local authorities: the
silent accomplices of Escobar’s effort to hide from the Search Bloc.
Most, however, were ready to turn the page and explore what
a world without Escobar would mean for the country. Of special
significance is the fact that Escobar’s death failed to attract vocal
criticism from defenders of civil liberties and individual rights,
either in Colombia or abroad. This is a telling fact. After all, at
that time, it was widely rumored that Escobar was killed
execution-style after he had been incapacitated by shots to the leg
and torso.279 If so, the fatal shot would have clearly been unlawful
under domestic and international law. Law-enforcement agents
can only use deadly force when it is the only way to prevent a
fleeing felon from escaping.280 But if—as many believe—Escobar
was already shot down before the fatal shot was fired, the third
shot was not necessary to prevent his escape.281 The alleged
275. See, e.g., Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Counter-Terrorism
Lessons from the War on Drugs, 45 SURVIVAL 187, 187 (2003) (“Indeed, members
of the US intelligence community acknowledge that drug enforcement raids in
Colombia during the 1990s serve as models for today’s counter-terror operations
in Afghanistan . . . .”).
276. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 266 (describing Escobar’s funeral as
“an occasion for grief” for many Colombians).
277. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 179 (1993) (defining
“barrio” as “a ward, quarter, or district of a city or town in Spanish-speaking
countries”).
278. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 266 (noting that those who lived in
Medellín were especially aggrieved over Escobar’s death and directed “promises
of revenge” toward the government).
279. See id. at 253–54 (describing the circumstances surrounding Escobar’s
death and the possibility that he was executed during the Search Bloc’s raid).
280. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (stating the common law
rule that lethal force may be used against a fleeing felon).
281. This, in fact, is what journalist Mark Bowden concluded after
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firefight that erupted between Escobar and the authorities when
the Search Bloc stormed Escobar’s hiding place does not justify
his killing either, at least if the aforementioned accounts of the
incident are believed. Escobar was killed while attempting to
escape from the police. Assuming that the police agents shot him
twice and, by doing so, successfully prevented him from escaping,
the previous firefight did not give them lawful authority to use
deadly force against him again if, at the time, Escobar was
already neutralized and no longer posing a threat.
C. Was Escobar’s Killing Justified?
Although the facts of Escobar’s killing suggest that
Colombian authorities may have violated the law, the death did
not generate outrage amongst the Colombian people, the
academy, or the international community. At an abstract level,
this is rather startling. How can the possibility of an extrajudicial
execution carried out by governmental authorities not raise
serious concerns? At a more basic level, however, there is nothing
puzzling about the lack of attention paid to the legality of
Escobar’s killing. Everyone knew that Escobar was a ruthless
killer. There was no doubt that he was responsible for some of the
worst crimes perpetrated in the latter portion of the twentieth
century. He was still a very dangerous man, and it seemed
impossible to bring him to justice. Members of the judiciary were
either in cahoots with him or feared for their lives. There seemed
to be no way out. Escobar had been imprisoned, and he had
escaped. Capturing him alive was an option fraught with peril.
The extrajudicial killing of any human being is a matter of
grave concern, and there remain powerful arguments against the
killing of Escobar. We are also mindful that Escobar’s killing did
not take place in a vacuum, and that the struggle against and
between Colombia’s drug lords included other extrajudicial
killings under different, less sympathetic circumstances,
including many by paramilitary groups suspected of government
examining the evidence. According to Bowden, the evidence suggests that the
shot that likely killed Escobar “is consistent with a shooter administering a coup
de grâce while standing over a downed man.” BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 254.
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ties.282 Our aim is not to endorse Colombian government policy as
a whole, or even to mount a full-blown defense of the Escobar
killing.
Our aim, instead, is more modest: to consider the Escobar
case in isolation and to identify features that favor its
justification. Escobar’s case presents, in many ways, the best case
that could be made for ordering the killing of someone outside of
war, in circumstances not necessary to prevent the person’s
escape, or to neutralize an imminent threat to the life or limb of
government officials or third parties. In other words, Escobar’s
killing presents us with the best case that can be made for
justifying a TK 4 case.
At least three factors seem to favor a justification for
Escobar’s killing. First, although not judicially established,
Escobar’s guilt for killing innocent human beings on numerous
occasions was never in serious doubt. This, of course, is not
enough to justify killing him in circumstances other than those
that allow for the use of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement
authority, or defense of self or others. Absent these
circumstances, there are very powerful reasons militating in
favor of capturing and trying an individual for his crimes, rather
than allowing government officials to kill him without affording
him due process of law. Nevertheless, the fact that Escobar’s guilt
was clearly established helps explain—along with other factors—
why an order to kill rather than capture him may have been
justified in this particular case.
A second factor justifying Escobar’s killing was that he
clearly remained a dangerous individual with the potential to
cause massive amounts of harm in the future. Even if it is
assumed that Escobar did not pose a threat to the life or limb of
the police officers or third parties at the time he was killed, there
were good reasons to believe that he would continue to engage in
serious crimes in the future. Once again, this alone is not enough
to justify killing Escobar. Many, if not most, people who are guilty
of committing homicide are dangerous and could thus continue to
engage in similar conduct in the future. Nonetheless, Escobar’s
282. See, e.g., supra notes 253–58 and accompanying text (describing actions
of paramilitary groups).
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dangerousness was different in kind from that of the typical
violent felon. Escobar was widely considered during the 1980s
and up to the time of his death to be the most dangerous drug
trafficker in the world.283 His crimes were different in scale from
the offenses committed by ordinary criminals. Before car bombs
became associated with the Middle East, Escobar used them to
kill innocent people and terrorize the citizenry.284
Escobar was complicit in the killing of police officers and
presidential candidates.285 He was widely believed to have played
a role in the killing of half of the members of the Colombian
Supreme Court.286 There was overwhelming evidence suggesting
that he ordered the downing of a commercial jetliner.287 Escobar
was no ordinary criminal. And his dangerousness was not
ordinary either.
Furthermore, Escobar showed no signs of slowing down, so
the authorities had every reason to expect his criminal activities
would continue and that, as a result, so would the body count. His
death put an end to the bloodbath. Coupled with the fact that
there was no doubt that Escobar was guilty of past serious
offenses, the case in favor of neutralizing him by whatever means
necessary was strong.
In spite of this, Escobar’s dangerousness could not, in and of
itself, justify killing him extrajudicially, even though his guilt for
committing serious offenses was not in doubt. These factors
clearly provide enough reasons to justify using force—deadly if
necessary—to capture an individual. They do not, however,
justify killing a person in a nonconfrontational scenario if it is
assumed that he could have been neutralized before he was
283. See id. at 138 (stating that DEA Chief Toft labeled Escobar “the most
notorious and dangerous cocaine trafficker in history”).
284. See id. at 57 (describing Escobar’s attempt to kill a high-ranking
Colombian general in charge of hunting him down by setting off a car bomb
alongside his vehicle, wounding numerous civilians).
285. See supra notes 226–42, 248–49 and accompanying text (describing
Escobar’s numerous egregious crimes).
286. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (noting that Escobar was
accused of being responsible for the deaths of multiple Colombian Supreme
Court Justices).
287. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (referencing accusations
that Escobar downed a commercial airliner as a means to assassinate a
potential presidential candidate).
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killed.288 An additional element was present here: the
unavailability of the traditional justice system as a secure means
to punish and incapacitate him.
Trying Escobar was virtually impossible. He had managed to
render the judiciary ineffective, at least with regard to him, by
either killing judges who were willing to take a stand against
him, or by bribing those who would accept the money.
Furthermore, even if trying him would have been feasible,
imprisoning him would have been nearly impossible. As his
escape from La Catedral demonstrated, Escobar was able to get
to almost anyone in order to have his way, including prison
guards and government officials. At the time, there appeared no
way of successfully trying, and subsequently imprisoning,
Escobar in Colombia. Finally, even if it is assumed, for the sake of
argument, that Escobar could have been successfully tried and
imprisoned, there is little reason to doubt that doing so would
have endangered the lives of those who played a role in the
process, including the officers who would escort him to and from
court, the judges who would preside over his trial, and the guards
who would be in charge of his custody. Additionally, Escobar’s
trial and imprisonment could very well have endangered the lives
of civilians who did not play a role in his capture and detention.
Escobar had shown that he was willing to do anything to get
what he wanted, and he had no trouble killing innocent people.
He would not have hesitated to do what he needed to prevent
trial and imprisonment, even if it meant killing innocents. Given
this reality, Colombia had strong reasons to avoid paying the
price involved in capturing and trying Escobar. These factors help
explain the absence of complaints in Colombia or elsewhere
following Escobar’s death.
Despite these considerations, there remains at least one
troubling aspect of Escobar’s demise, even under an account that
gives weight to the factors outlined above. This is the reported
fact that Escobar was already cornered and debilitated at the
time of his shooting.289 The problem here is similar to the one we
288. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (noting that Escobar was
probably neutralized before the fatal shot was fired).
289. See Schmidle, supra note 4, at 43 (stating that bin Laden was found
unarmed).
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briefly considered with respect to hors de combat status as
defined in IHL.290 Under the war paradigm, the permissive
approach to killing ceases upon the target’s incapacitation,
namely upon his having been rendered unconscious “or otherwise
incapacitated by wounds or sickness” and being, therefore,
“incapable of defending himself.”291 This distinction reflects the
logic of risk—combatants are presumptively dangerous and are
targetable only so long as that presumption retains plausibility—
but not entirely. The wounded soldier maintains her immunity
from attack even as she is evacuated to a friendly hospital where
she may recover to rejoin the fight. Manifest, here, is also a sense
of chivalry, a moral revulsion against killing the helpless
irrespective of their potential future danger.
This applies to the Escobar case, as well. The considerations
favoring his killing, as we have outlined them, apply whether or
not he was at large at the time of his targeting. But even if one
accepts a more permissive approach to lethal force in cases like
Escobar’s, the killing of a suspect already arrested presents a
different moral calculus, one in which the use of lethal force
becomes indefensible, even in the extraordinary circumstances we
have described. One might also draw the line at the moment of
Escobar’s incapacitation, when he effectively fell into the power of
government authorities.
This qualification, however, is not fatal to the broader claim
that a more permissive approach to killing was appropriate in
Escobar’s case. For example, one could object to the specific
circumstances of his killing while nevertheless maintaining that
he, like a combatant in armed conflict, was appropriately subject
to being targeted in a broad set of nonconfrontational scenarios,
so long as he remained at large.
V. Pablo Escobar and the Morality of Targeted Killings
The suggestion that Escobar might have been a justifiable
TK 4 target presents a prima facie conflict with the limits that
290. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing hors de combat
status).
291. Additional Protocol I, supra note 39, art. 41(c).

1448

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1371 (2012)

deeply ingrained principles of criminal law impose on official
action. In this Part, we discuss how a narrowly drawn TK 4
justification might be integrated into conventional criminal law
thinking. In particular, we consider the relationship of this
justification to limits on preemptive action, punishment
philosophy, and due process values.
In addition, we consider whether this justification is
reducible to a judicially administrable test. We acknowledge that
there is indeterminacy in the framework we outline, and we
observe that this indeterminacy is not qualitatively different from
that already inherent in administering established justifications
for the use of lethal force. That said, we are mindful that special
caution is warranted when considering proposals to relax the
norm against killing, including concerns about official abuse of an
expanded rule and the risk of creating a slippery slope. If these
concerns preclude the acceptance of a TK 4 justification within
the law, our model may nevertheless have value in indicating
when targeted killings can be tolerated as a matter of social
morality, even if not technically legal.
Finally, we qualify our argument by highlighting several
important questions that arise in the context of targeted killing
but remain outside the scope of our analysis.
A. Targeted Killing Partially Justified as Preemptive Action
Most justifications afford individuals a defense to criminal
liability when they harm another in order to prevent a future
harm to self or others. Self-defense is a paradigmatic example.
The person who employs defensive force takes preemptive action
in order to avoid harm to his person. Although there is much
debate about the reasons that justify acting in self-defense in
borderline cases,292 there is wide agreement about the fact that
the harm avoided by the defensive action is relevant to explaining
the justifiable nature of such conduct.293
292. See George P. Fletcher & Luis E. Chiesa, Self-Defense and the Psychotic
Aggressor, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 365, 365–72 (Paul H. Robinson,
Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) (discussing the
justifications of use of defensive force against the psychotic aggressor).
293. See id. at 365 (noting that “it is hard to see either the justice or efficacy
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The use of deadly force pursuant to law-enforcement
authority is also morally justified because it prevents a future
harm. By using such force, police officers prevent harm to
themselves, harm to others, and the harm inherent in allowing a
dangerous felon to escape.294 Admittedly, it is debatable whether
the harm inherent in escaping from police custody is sufficiently
grave to warrant using deadly force to prevent it.295 Nevertheless,
once it is accepted that the harm of escaping capture is
significant enough to justify employing deadly force, it becomes
clear that the justification for using such force is prospective
rather than retrospective. The individual is not harmed to exact
retribution for what he is suspected to have done, or to retaliate
in response for past wrongdoing, but rather to prevent the
occurrence of a future harm.
The use of force pursuant to the lesser-evils defense can be
morally justified in a similar manner. The reason why it is
acceptable to cause harm to an innocent person pursuant to this
defense is that, by doing so, one prevents an even greater harm
from taking place.296 Once again, the moral justification for
engaging in this harmful conduct is preemptive because the use
of force in these circumstances is a way of averting an untoward
state of affairs that will take place in the future, rather than a
method for punishing the harmed individual for past behavior.
Can TK 4 killings be morally justified by appealing to such
preemptive rationales? There is certainly a preemptive dimension
to such targeted killings. A salutary consequence of killing a
manifestly dangerous individual such as Escobar is that doing so
of punishing someone who kills [a deadly attacker] for the sake of selfpreservation”).
294. Allowing a suspected felon to escape hinders the effective operation of
the criminal justice system.
295. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(i), (2)(b)(iv)(B) (1962) (restricting
justifiable use of deadly force by law-enforcement officers to certain situations,
including arrests for felonies or if “there is a substantial risk that the person to
be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury if his apprehension is
delayed”).
296. See id. § 3.02 (“Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid
a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm
or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be
prevented by the law . . . .”).
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eliminates the possibility that he will be involved in future
attacks.297 If the possibility of future attacks is substantial, then
the prospect of preventing them by killing the actor certainly
counts in favor of this course of action.
Nevertheless, this factor alone should not be enough to
justify the killing of an individual in TK 4 cases. Domestic
criminal law circumscribes the authorization to use deadly force
to cases in which the force is necessary to prevent an imminent
future attack298 or a non-imminent, known future aggression that
can only be averted by the preemptive use of deadly force.299
There are good reasons for imposing these strict limitations.
When the attack is not sufficiently imminent, or there is
uncertainty about when and if a future aggression will take place,
it is likely that the conflict may be resolved without using deadly
force.300 Perhaps the individual will not carry out the attack or
the police may thwart it without resorting to deadly force. It is a
generally accepted principle that force calculated to take life
should only be used when all else fails.301 It is unclear whether
297. It is worth noting that killing the dangerous individual might also
generate violence. For example, the associates of the killed individual might
harm innocent people in order to avenge the death.
298. See Ferzan, supra note 167, at 222–23 (noting that the use of deadly
force in “[d]omestic self-defense is wholly preventative,” but a threat of unlawful
force must be imminent to “trigger the right to self-defense”).
299. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1), (2)(b) (stipulating that the use of
deadly force is justified if “immediately necessary for the purpose” of protection
against “death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse” on the
“present occasion”).
300. See Dressler, supra note 171, at 467 (noting the importance of
“imminency” in self-defense justifications and that, because there is no
imminence when a battered woman murders her sleeping spouse, “we will never
know for sure . . . whether some other, less extreme, remedy would have been
sufficient”).
301. This is why deadly force pursuant to self-defense, law-enforcement
authority, and the lesser-evils defense is only justified when it is necessary to
prevent a harm. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (authorizing
the use of deadly force if the law-enforcement officer reasonably believes it is
necessary to defend himself or others); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985)
(stating that, under certain circumstances, “[c]onduct that the actor believes to
be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable”);
Dressler, supra note 171, at 466 (“Stemming from the common law, a core
feature of self-defense law is that the life of every person, even that of an
aggressor, should not be terminated if there is a less extreme way to resolve the
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using lethal force is necessary in TK 4 cases because the agents
who order the killing simply do not know with sufficient certainty
whether the targeted individual is actually planning a future
attack, one which can only be thwarted by killing the target.302
Although they might justifiably expect that future attacks will
take place, that expectation is not enough to authorize the killing
of a human being.
This does not mean that the possibility of thwarting a future
attack is irrelevant to justifying the killing of the targeted
individual. It surely is. More needs to be demonstrated, however,
in order to flout the basic principle that a person should not be
killed unless it is the only way of preventing future harm to the
lives of others. The likelihood of averting a future attack is, in
sum, a necessary, but insufficient, condition for justifying a TK 4
killing.
B. Targeted Killing Partially Justified as Retaliatory
(Punitive) Action
It is sometimes morally justified for the government to inflict
harm to a non-threatening individual deliberately. Sometimes it
may even be morally justified for the government to kill a nonthreatening person deliberately.303 The paradigmatic example is
state-sanctioned punishment.
Many theories have been advanced to justify the imposition
of punishment. Consequentialist theories of punishment—such as
those rooted in deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
justify punishment primarily by reference to the good
consequences that follow from its imposition.304 Deontological
theories of punishment—such as retribution—justify punishment
primarily by reference to the fact that punishing a person who
problem.”).
302. In cases of group crime, for example, killing a group’s leader might fail
to prevent others from carrying out a planned attack.
303. This statement, however, assumes that the death penalty is morally
justified, which is an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article.
304. See R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 3–4
(2001) (discussing consequentialism, which “insists that the justification of any
human practice depends on its actual or expected consequences”).
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has done something worthy of condemnation is intrinsically good
even if no additional good consequences follow from doing so.305 In
spite of their differences, consequentialist and deontological
approaches to punishment have something important in common.
Both theories conceive of the imposition of punishment as a
response to a wrongful act committed by the person to be
punished.306 Thus, regardless of what is believed to be the aim of
punishment, it is imposed for an act of wrongdoing that took
place in the past.307 Otherwise, the imposition of sanctions would
seem random and arbitrary because punishment is, by definition,
something that happens only after a determination that the
person to be punished has committed an offense.308 In other
words, there is an essential feature of punishment that is
backward-looking even if its imposition is justified by appealing
to forward-looking consequentialist criteria.309 Punishment is
imposed because someone has done something wrong, even if the
aim of imposing it is to deter others from engaging in similar acts
in the future or to prevent the offender from recidivating.310
Can targeted killings in TK 4 cases sometimes be morally
justified by appealing to reasons that are similar to those that
305. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 87 (1997) (stating that in
retributivism “the good that punishment achieves is that someone who deserves
it gets it”). Furthermore, “[p]unishment of the guilty is thus for the retributivist
an intrinsic good.” Id.
306. See Luis Ernesto Chiesa Aponte, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law:
A Reasons Theory of Wrongdoing, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 102, 109 (2007)
(explaining that “punishment is imposed for the commission of an act that
represents an untoward state of affairs”).
307. See id. at 113 (“[N]o punishment can be coherently imposed when there
is no wrongdoing no matter what theory of punishment one espouses.”).
308. See id. at 106 (stating that “punishment would simply not make sense
without wrongdoing”). Furthermore, “imposing punishment without the
commission of an offense would be akin to the state’s production of random and
arbitrary violence.” Id. at 110.
309. See id. at 109–10 (explaining that the connection between punishment
and offense “highlights the centrality of the concept of ‘wrongdoing’ in
explaining the true nature of punishment insofar as it entails inflicting pain
upon a person for having committed an offense and not just for the sake of social
protection”).
310. See id. at 106–07 (explaining that scholars have agreed over the years
that punishment is a response to wrongdoing even though the aim of
punishment varies with different theories).
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justify the practice of state-sanctioned punishment? Perhaps a
state-ordered targeted killing is nothing more than an
extrajudicial way of imposing punishment. This is especially the
case if it is assumed that the targeted person has committed
grave crimes in the past.
The problem with justifying targeted killings in this manner
is that it runs afoul of the basic principle that the state is not
allowed to harm an individual for punitive purposes without first
establishing his guilt in a judicial proceeding. There are many
sound reasons for that principle. First, we trust the judicial
process more than any other government process, both in terms of
providing unbiased outcomes and in terms of providing the best
forum for discovering the truth. Second, we are skeptical of
consolidating in one branch of government the power to
investigate wrongdoing, adjudicate guilt, and carry out sentences.
We simply do not trust the executive to be judge, jury, and
executioner. Although it can be argued that judicial proceedings
are a formality when there is no doubt about the offender’s guilt,
it is generally best to adhere to such formalities. Making
exceptions to this rule would rapidly take us down a dangerous,
slippery slope, which makes it very difficult to tell when a judicial
proceeding is necessary.
This does not mean that targeted killings in TK 4 cases do
not have a punitive dimension or that this feature of the practice
is irrelevant to explaining its moral justifiability. Certainty about
past wrongful acts committed by the targeted person is relevant
to the legitimacy of authorizing his killing. If there is no certainty
about such matters, it is not legitimate to order the killing. Such
certainty, however, cannot by itself establish the moral
legitimacy of orders to kill an individual in a nonconfrontational
setting.
C. Targeted Killing Partially Justified Because of Difficulty or
Dangerousness of Trying the Perpetrator
Targeted killings in TK 4 cases serve a preemptive function.
The government protects its citizens when it kills a manifestly
dangerous individual who is nearly certain to engage in future
acts of wrongdoing. These killings also serve a punitive function.
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There are good desert-based and consequentialist-based reasons
for punishing a person who has engaged in unspeakable crimes.
Although one would prefer that judicial means be used to
adjudicate guilt and mete out punishment in such cases,
achieving justice is not always so easy. Ordering the killings of
individuals may sometimes be the only available means of doing
some kind of justice. Nevertheless, morally justifying this
practice requires more than demonstrating that it serves
preemptive and punitive functions. In the case of preemptive
strikes, deadly force is usually authorized only if its use is
necessary to thwart an imminent attack.311 If there is no
imminent attack, the use of deadly force is usually not necessary
and therefore not morally justifiable.312 In the case of punitive
acts, deadly force is only authorized pursuant to a judicial
determination of guilt. The rule of law requires no less.
There are a handful of cases, however, in which ordering the
use of deadly force in a nonconfrontational setting and without a
judicial adjudication of guilt becomes more defensible as a
reasonable and morally acceptable course of action. The cases
that come to mind involve TK 4 scenarios in which deadly force is
used in a nonconfrontational setting against a dangerous
individual who has engaged in serious crimes in the past. The use
of deadly force appears to be morally justified when trying the
individual will be either extraordinarily difficult or unacceptably
dangerous. The difficulty or dangerousness of capturing and
trying the targeted person is morally relevant to ordering her
killing because it makes a judicial determination of guilt
impossible or too risky.
The difficulties involved in trying the individual can be
insurmountable, depending on the circumstances. Perhaps the
individual cannot be apprehended without exposing law
enforcement or bystanders to excessive risks. The jurisdiction in
which the individual is going to be tried might not have a
properly functioning legal system, if it is in a war-torn area, for
instance. In other cases, despite the existence of a legal system
311. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing preemptive
strikes and the requirement of an imminent attack).
312. See id. (explaining that deadly force is not necessary without an
imminent attack during a preemptive strike).
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that works acceptably in most cases, the trial of a particular
person or group of persons is not possible for whatever reason.
This is what happened in the case of Pablo Escobar.
Although Colombia’s legal system was not entirely dysfunctional,
it was not properly equipped to deal with the likes of Escobar and
other top-level drug traffickers.313 As a result of Escobar’s plata o
plomo policy, there appeared to be no judge in Colombia who
could preside over his trial.314 Those courageous enough to defy
him were killed.315 Those who were not as courageous were
bought off by Escobar.316 By the late 1980s, it was obvious that
the Colombian judiciary did not have the tools necessary to try a
man as ruthless and dangerous as Escobar.317
In addition, trying the individual could sometimes be
unwarranted because, although logistically feasible, doing so
would prove unacceptably dangerous. It is important to note the
risks inherent in detaining and trying the suspect would need to
be extraordinarily high before contemplating an extrajudicial
killing.
It is not enough, in our view, to claim that trying the
targeted individual might jeopardize the lives of innocent people.
Speculative harm, even probable harm, is not enough to justify
dispensing with due process. One would have to know to a
substantial certainty that trying the targeted individual would
cause significant harm to innocent parties. It would also be
necessary to know to a substantial certainty that the harms
inherent in trying the individual would significantly outweigh the
harms inherent in killing him.

313. See BOWDEN, supra note 221, at 51 (explaining that Pablo Escobar,
through his power and popularity, was able to buy off and threaten the
Colombian court system).
314. See id. (stating Escobar’s plata o plomo strategy became so effective by
1984 that Escobar became untouchable to the courts, and Colombia’s democracy
was undermined).
315. See id. at 53 (stating that by the end of 1986 there were few judges
alive who defied Escobar’s plata o plomo strategy).
316. See id. at 52 (stating that Escobar was responsible for the deaths of at
least thirty judges).
317. See id. at 53 (discussing that by the late 1980s the drug cartel had
taken over and “Colombia had been corrupted and terrorized to its core”).
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This last qualification is essential, given that every course of
action generates certain kinds of benefits and costs. Although
killing the individual could have the salutary consequence of
stopping some violence, it could also generate significant societal
costs inherent in not observing due process. It might also
generate retaliatory bloodshed. On the other hand, trying the
individual could have the positive effect of enhancing the
perceived legitimacy of imposing punishment on the individual. It
might, however, generate negative consequences, such as
kidnappings, suicide bombings, and other terrorist attacks
orchestrated by the detainee’s supporters intent on securing his
release.
In sum, regardless of the specific costs and benefits that
attach to either killing or trying the individual, killing in a TK 4
case should not be permissible unless it is known with
substantial certainty that the risks inherent in capturing and
trying the individual are extraordinarily high and significantly
greater than the risks inherent in killing without trial. Because
the right to due process of law is crucial to maintaining a
legitimate and just system of criminal justice, this right must
always be observed, except in the most extraordinary of
circumstances, when killing without capture and trial is
necessary to avoid certain and significant harm to innocent
human beings.
Escobar’s case is again a case on point. Even if logistically
feasible, trying Escobar was unacceptably dangerous. The
government was acutely aware of this because an organization
known as “Los Extraditables” publicly vowed to kill any judge
who dared try Escobar for murder.318 It also threatened to kill the
families of those who wanted to indict Escobar in the local
courts.319 Escobar’s supporters were also known for kidnapping
innocent people whom he would then use as bargaining chips to
obtain what he wanted from the government.320 There was,
318. See id. at 55 (revealing that, when a judge had attempted to indict
Pablo Escobar for murder, Los Extraditables threatened to kill the judge and his
family).
319. See id. (“We are capable of executing you at any place on this
planet . . . in the meantime, you will see the fall, one by one, of all the members
of your family.”).
320. See id. (detailing how supporters of Pablo Escobar kidnapped “the
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therefore, reason to expect with some certainty that kidnappings
would have increased had Escobar been caught and detained for
trial. Escobar had also successfully escaped from prison the one
time he had been detained.321 He would surely have attempted to
do so again, and he had demonstrated an ability to kill those who
might stand in his way.
Asking for a judicial determination of guilt in cases like
Escobar’s is quixotic. Sometimes a legal system is not equipped to
make the necessary determinations, and setting the judicial
wheels in motion is likely to trigger a series of events that
endanger so many innocent people that it is better not to proceed.
Circumstances such as these do not occur often. But when they
do, ordering the extrajudicial killing of the individual might not
only be sensible but also morally justifiable.
D. Justifiable Targeted Killings in TK 4 Cases—In Search
of a Test
The TK 4 justification we have outlined centers on three
criteria, all present in the Escobar case. First, an extrajudicial
killing in a TK 4 case should only be authorized if the targeted
individual is likely to carry out, or to substantially help carry out,
atrocities in the future. There need not be proof of an imminent
attack that is being planned by the individual, but there must be
an expectation, grounded on specific and articulable facts, that
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a future attack
on innocent human beings is likely, even if its occurrence is not
absolutely certain. Furthermore, the future attacks must be of a
particularly grave nature that transcends the commission of a
discrete offence. As a general rule, the attack must be part of
some widespread or systematic campaign. Future large-scale
terrorist attacks surely satisfy this standard. A typical robbery or
murder will not.

journalist son of a former president and Conservative candidate for mayor of
Bogotá”).
321. See id. at 107–55 (describing the details of Escobar’s escape from
prison).

1458

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1371 (2012)

Second, there must be no reasonable doubt about the
targeted individual’s responsibility for past atrocities. This
requirement is often satisfied because the targeted individual has
publicly taken responsibility for such atrocities.
Third, the capture and trial of the individual must be
logistically impossible or extraordinarily dangerous. As we
discussed in the previous subpart, this standard is limited to
exceptional circumstances and will seldom be satisfied because
there is a very strong presumption in favor of affording the
targeted individual the due process of law. The legal system must
be unavailable to try the individual because it is not functioning,
because it is impossible to try the specific individual for reasons
such as the killing and intimidation of those judges willing to try
the targeted individual, or because capture and trial would
involve a substantial certainty of harm to innocent parties—a
harm that significantly outweighs the harms inherent in killing
the individual.
Even if one accepts, in principle, that certain killings meeting
the above criteria can be morally justified, distinct concerns
center on the desirability of reducing these factors to a legal test.
It may be objected, for example, that the factors we have outlined
fail to provide sufficient guidance in concrete cases and are
resistant to judicial application (assuming that judicial review is
available), thus exposing the law to a slippery slope. There is also
the potential for governmental abuse, in which the TK 4
justification is invoked to legitimize killings that do not rightfully
fall within the narrow exception we have outlined.322
As a general matter, it is difficult—if not impossible—to craft
a bright-line test for determining when the killing of a human
being should be justified. Even in easy cases, such as self-defense,
the general parameters of the justification are crafted in
relatively vague terms that allow for some leeway in the
application of the rule. Thus, we say that using deadly force in
self-defense is justified if such force was reasonably believed to be
necessary to avert an imminent and unlawful aggression, and
only if such force was proportional to the threatened harm.323 The
322. See Waldron, supra note 71, at 5–9 (discussing bad faith examples of
targeted killing).
323. See Dressler, supra note 171, at 461 (stating that the traditional rule
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precise scope of the italicized terms is rather fuzzy, especially in
borderline cases. Is the reasonable belief to be judged from an
impartial perspective that does not take into account the
experience and physical and mental attributes of the actor, or
should it be judged according to what would appear reasonable in
light of the specific traits and experience of the individual? Is the
force used by the actor necessary only if it is the sole available
means to avert the threat, or is it necessary as long as the actor is
unaware of other means that may also defuse the threat? Does a
threat to use force within the next five minutes count as an
“imminent” threat, or does the defender need to wait several
minutes until the force is about to be employed? Is a threat
unlawful if it violates any law or regulation regardless of whether
it is civil, administrative, or criminal law, or is it unlawful only if
it violates some particular body of law (criminal or tort law, for
example)? Finally, is force lawful only if it is strictly proportional
to the harm threatened, or is some degree of disproportionality
allowed?324
Determining whether deadly force is lawful pursuant to other
justification defenses is equally problematic. Consider the case of
deadly force used pursuant to law-enforcement authority. As a
general rule, such force is only lawful if it is necessary to prevent
the escape of a fleeing felon that poses a threat to the lives of the
officer or third parties.325 Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Scott v. Harris, deadly force used by lawenforcement agents comports with Fourth Amendment standards
only if the use of such force was reasonable given the dangerous
for self-defense “is that self-protective force can only be used to repel an ongoing
unlawful attack or what the defender reasonably believes is an imminent
unlawful assault”). Furthermore, the “use of deadly force is not
justifiable . . . unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect
himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse
compelled by force or threat.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (2010).
324. This is an under-studied question in American criminal law. It would
seem that self-defense allows for the use of disproportionate force as long as it is
not grossly disproportionate. For example, in every jurisdiction one may use
deadly force to avert serious bodily injury, although the force used causes more
harm (death) than the threatened harm (grave bodily injury). Similarly, it
would seem that one may use deadly force to thwart rape.
325. See supra notes 198–203 and accompanying text (discussing what force
is necessary to use for law enforcement in the case of a fleeing felon).
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circumstances.326 Although perhaps necessary, the vagueness of
this approach is evident.
Given that the parameters for using deadly force are fuzzy
even in the case of well-established justification defenses, such as
self-defense and law-enforcement authority, it should come as no
surprise that we have not provided a bright-line test for
authorizing targeted killings. It is simply impossible, in this
context, to come up with something other than general guidelines
that frame the relevant issues that ought to be considered when
assessing the justifiability of targeted killings in TK 4 cases.
Although admittedly fuzzy, the framework proposed here
does not strike us as being significantly vaguer or more
problematic than the general frameworks that are currently in
place to assess the justified nature of force used pursuant to selfdefense and law-enforcement authority.
We further acknowledge the possibility—indeed probability—
that some governments will abuse a legal doctrine establishing a
justification along the lines we have set forth. Once again,
however, this problem is ever-present and not unique to the
particular context of our analysis. A government wishing to abuse
its authority under the cloak of the law already has ample room
to do so within existing accepted legal doctrines, for example, by
manufacturing claims of self-defense to justify what is in fact an
impermissible extrajudicial killing. Indeed, we suspect this would
typically be the easier path, considering the strictness of the
factors we have offered. The question, therefore, is not whether
governments would seek to abuse a new legal doctrine justifying
a limited number of TK 4 cases, but whether the establishment of
such a doctrine would be uniquely susceptible to abuse. We doubt
that it is.
Nevertheless, we are mindful of the sensitivity and caution
that is warranted whenever contemplating any expansion of the
legal permission to kill. We therefore have our doubts about the
advisability of adopting our framework as law, but it may
nevertheless have value as a measure of social morality. In other
words, even if the law does not itself justify any TK 4 killings,
326. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007) (stating that the
officer’s actions were reasonable considering the high likelihood, although not
certainty, of danger from the fleeing motorist’s driving).
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those that meet the criteria we have outlined will receive a de
facto public justification. In this sense, our framework has
descriptive value: it identifies circumstances in which TK 4
killings, whether or not legally permitted by codified law, will
receive broad public acceptance and prove resistant to official
scrutiny.
E. Some Qualifications
The criteria we have identified provide, in our view, the best
justification for using lethal force in a TK 4 case. It is important
to acknowledge, however, several points that further qualify and
limit our framework.
First, we do not address the threats to international security
that can result from targeted killings that cross international
borders. In suggesting that Colombian authorities may have been
justified in using lethal force to neutralize Escobar in a
nonconfrontational setting,327 we do not suggest that the United
States, for example, could have invoked the same justification to
deploy agents into Colombian territory to target Escobar without
the consent of Colombian authorities. Whether and when the
interests justifying a TK 4 targeting might likewise justify a
cross-border intervention is an important question that remains
outside the scope of this Article.
Second, we do not maintain that the interests justifying a TK
4 targeting might likewise justify the expected incidental loss of
innocent life, as is permitted, for example, by the IHL
proportionality test that applies to the conduct of armed
conflict.328 Our framework instead presumes the continued force
of the general criminal law rule dictating that governmental
agents may not knowingly take innocent life even if doing so is
the only way of killing or capturing a fleeing felon or an otherwise
dangerous individual.329 Whether or not extraordinary

327. See supra Part IV (discussing the Escobar case).
328. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing
proportionality requirement).
329. See supra Part III.D (providing the law-enforcement defense).

the
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circumstances might justify relaxing this rule is a matter we do
not consider.330
Finally, we emphasize that the three-part test we have
identified requires an individualized assessment of the targeted
individual. For example, an individual targeted based solely on
her membership in a group that meets our criteria only on a
collective basis would fall outside the framework. For the criteria
to apply, they must be met on an individualized basis.
VI. The Killing of Osama bin Laden as Self-Defense or
Law Enforcement
With this framework in mind, we now return to the killing of
Osama bin Laden and consider whether justifications other than
that provided by IHL might apply.
A. Was bin Laden’s Killing Justified Pursuant to Self-Defense?
Assuming, for present purposes, that IHL is inapplicable,
might bin Laden’s killing nevertheless have been justified as an
act of self-defense? Of course, the answer depends on what
exactly transpired the day of his killing. If he was in fact armed,
or if he fired at members of the Navy SEAL team that raided his
compound, his killing would amount to a justifiable act of defense
of self or others.
Matters become more complicated, however, if one assumes—
as some reports indicate331—that bin Laden was unarmed and did
not threaten physical violence. In that event, killing is not as
easily justified as an act of self-defense. The reason for this is
simple. The use of force in self-defense is triggered by the use or
threat of unlawful force.332 The unlawful aggression must also be
330. For an analysis of this question as applied to the defense of self and
others, see Chiesa, supra note 306.
331. See, e.g., Schmidle, supra note 4, at 43 (stating that bin Laden was
unarmed).
332. See FLETCHER & OHLIN, supra note 64, at 89 (explaining that it would
be “hard to find a national statute on self-defense that failed to require that the
attack be unlawful”).
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imminent.333 If bin Laden was unarmed and not about to attack
the SEAL team, there would have been no imminent wrongful
aggression to trigger the right to use defensive force.
It should be noted, however, that the absence of an imminent
and wrongful aggression is not in and of itself fatal to a claim of
self-defense. Bin Laden’s killing would also be justified in selfdefense if the shooter acted upon a reasonable belief that bin
Laden was about to attack them.334 The reasonable belief would
justify the killing even if the belief happened to be mistaken.335
This is, in fact, one of the arguments advanced by U.S. officials in
defense of the bin Laden killing.336
But what if one assumes that it was unreasonable for the
SEAL team to believe that bin Laden was about to launch an
attack? Of course, we will likely never know whether such a belief
was reasonable or not for the SEALs to hold. For that matter, we
may never know whether individual members of the team
subjectively believed that bin Laden was a threat. For all we
know, the question may have played no role in the operation
because the team members were acting under rules of
engagement derived from IHL. Thus, it is worth asking whether
the killing of bin Laden would have been justified even if the
SEALs did not believe that their lives were in danger at the time.

333. See id. at 90–91 (explaining that most jurisdictions require an unlawful
attack to be imminent to justify self-defense).
334. See, e.g., supra note 181 and accompanying text (describing one state’s
self-defense law, which requires reasonable belief); People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d
41, 49 (N.Y. 1986) (applying the test that a sufficient basis to use deadly force is
justified if “the situation justified the defendant as a reasonable man in
believing that he was about to be murderously attacked”).
335. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 48 (emphasizing that if a reasonable belief is
established, then “deadly force could be justified . . . even if the actor’s beliefs as
to the intentions of another turned out to be wrong”).
336. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Osama Bin Laden Was Unarmed
During Navy SEAL Raid, Says White House, HUFFINGTON POST, May 3, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/03/osama-bin-laden-unarmed-duringraid_n_857257.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (quoting CIA Director Leon
Panetta as asserting that the SEALs fired because bin Laden made “some
threatening moves . . . that clearly represented a clear threat to our guys”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Self-defense is off the table if this assumption is made. A
person’s lack of an objectively reasonable belief that his life or the
life of another is in danger is fatal to a claim of self-defense.337
The same would be true under an expanded version of selfdefense. Even if we assume that the U.S. government possessed
credible and specific information that bin Laden was going to
launch an attack against American interests in the near future,
the killing could not be justified as an instance of preemptive selfdefense unless killing was the only way to prevent the attack.338
This requirement could not be met under the circumstances if bin
Laden were readily susceptible to capture. Moreover, absent the
type of specific information we have just hypothesized, mere
speculation about possible attacks that bin Laden might launch
in the future would not be enough to justify killing him pursuant
to the standard arguments favoring preemptive self-defense.339
B. Was bin Laden’s Killing Justified Pursuant to LawEnforcement Authority or the Lesser-Evils Defense?
Governmental agents may on occasion use more force in
furtherance of law-enforcement authority than they may use
pursuant to self-defense or defense of others. Although deadly
force in defense of self or others may only be employed in order to
deflect an imminent aggression, police officers may sometimes
use lethal force in order to prevent a fleeing felon from escaping
even if, at the time the force is used, the felon is not threatening
imminent harm.340 This defense, as Finkelstein has persuasively
argued, may thus justify certain killings in circumstances in
which traditional self-defense is inapplicable.341 Can it be invoked
to justify bin Laden’s killing?
337. See Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 48 (stating that for self-defense to be justified,
there must “be a reasonable basis, viewed objectively, for the beliefs”).
338. See supra Part III.C (explaining the elements of an expanded version of
self-defense).
339. See supra Part III.C (explaining the elements of an expanded version of
self-defense).
340. See, e.g., supra Part III.D (describing when law-enforcement agents
may use deadly force against felons).
341. See supra notes 196–97 (discussing Claire Finkelstein’s theory that
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Again, the answer to this question depends on the
circumstances surrounding the killing. If bin Laden was
attempting to flee, then the SEAL team members might have
been justified in using deadly force to prevent his escape. On the
other hand, if the SEALs fired at bin Laden without first
attempting to arrest him, or if bin Laden did not attempt escape,
conventional law-enforcement authority could not supply a
justification for the use of deadly force.
Assuming that bin Laden was not armed when he was killed
and that he did not threaten harm, the choice-of-evils or necessity
defense would likewise fail: necessity may only be invoked to
justify a use of force that is necessary to prevent an imminent
harm from taking place.342 Once again, bin Laden’s dangerous
character does not by itself justify using deadly force against him.
The use of force pursuant to necessity, like self-defense, is
triggered by the threat of suffering imminent harm, not by the
possibility that a dangerous individual will try to cause harm in
the future.
C. Was bin Laden’s Killing Otherwise Justifiable?
Assuming that bin Laden’s killing was not supported by a
reasonable belief that he threatened to harm the SEAL team
members, it becomes difficult to justify by appealing to the
conventionally accepted justification defenses recognized under
domestic law. Might bin Laden’s killing be an instance of a TK 4
case, in which ordering the killing of an unarmed and nonthreatening individual is nevertheless justifiable?
The case is similar in some aspects to Escobar’s case. First,
bin Laden had publicly taken responsibility for engaging in
unspeakable crimes.343 There was thus no doubt about his
targeted killings might be legally justified pursuant to the law-enforcement
authority to use deadly force).
342. See supra Part III.E (explaining the elements of the necessity defense
for use of force).
343. See Bin Laden Claims Responsibility for 9/11, CBC NEWS, Oct. 29,
2004, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2004/10/29/binladen_message041029.
html (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (announcing that bin Laden officially and
publicly claimed “direct responsibility for the 2001 attacks against the United
States”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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responsibility for the death of thousands of innocent human
beings. As a result, trying him would have been, in a sense, a
formality. Although perhaps deemed necessary to uphold the rule
of law, bin Laden’s trial would not really be necessary to establish
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, bin Laden, like Escobar, was the head of a very
dangerous organization that was still operating at the time of his
killing. We had (and still have) good reasons to believe that al
Qaeda will attempt to kill innocent people in the future.344 As a
result, bin Laden’s killing could be viewed as serving both
punitive and preventive functions. On the one hand, his killing
could be construed as punishment for his past crimes. On the
other, his killing could prevent crime by helping debilitate al
Qaeda’s command structure.
In a typical case, these considerations are insufficient to
justify killing a non-threatening individual. As a general rule,
deadly force should only be authorized in order to defuse an
imminent threat or pursuant to a sentence secured after
affording the individual the due process of law.345 As Escobar’s
case demonstrates, however, extrajudicially killing the individual
may be a reasonable course of action, even assuming capture is
feasible, if trying him is either impossible or unacceptably
dangerous. This is where significant differences arise between
Escobar’s case and bin Laden’s.
First, it is difficult to argue that trying bin Laden would have
been logistically impossible. The United States certainly has the
resources to orchestrate trials of dangerous individuals. Although
setting up a fair trial for bin Laden might have been difficult and
costly, there is no doubt that it would have been feasible.
Second, it is speculative to assume that the dangers
associated with capturing and trying bin Laden would have been
sufficiently high to justify dispensing with a trial. Of course,
trying bin Laden would have posed certain risks. For instance,
344. See Obama, supra note 1 (“[The United States] quickly learned that the
9/11 attacks were carried out by al Qaeda—an organization headed by Osama
bin Laden, which had openly declared war on the United States and was
committed to killing innocents in our country and around the globe.”).
345. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text (explaining that deadly
force is usually authorized in cases when the force is necessary to prevent an
imminent future attack).
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his capture and trial might have prompted retaliatory terrorist
attacks or put American citizens at risk of being kidnapped and
used as bargaining chips to gain his release. This is a risk that
Colombian authorities had to ponder when deciding whether to
capture and try Escobar.346 Although these concerns should not
be trivialized, one can only speculate with regard to the likelihood
that they would actually materialize. Also, it is quite possible
that the risks inherent in killing bin Laden were as significant as
the risks inherent in capturing and trying him. The risk of
retaliatory attacks, for example, exists under either scenario.
We do not believe these risks suffice to justify dispensing
with a trial in bin Laden’s case. The decision to order the
extrajudicial killing of an individual should not be taken lightly,
and speculative assessments of the dangerousness of trying the
actor should not justify taking such momentous action.
At the same time, however, we believe that the reasons that
undergird our theory of justifiable killings in TK 4 cases may
explain public intuitions about the bin Laden killing better than
the reasons associated with the other available justifications for
targeted killings. That is, many people seem to believe that
killing bin Laden was the right thing to do because he was a
dangerous individual, he was responsible for mass atrocities, and
trying him would be a complicated affair. This helps explain why
President Obama asserted that “justice has been done” when bin
Laden was killed.347 This assertion does not sound like the
language of preventive self-defense or law-enforcement authority.
It does not sound like the language of national self-defense either.
The American ideal is that justice is meted out in the courtroom
after observing due process and judicially establishing the
defendant’s guilt. A killing in individual or national self-defense
is not a way to do justice, but rather a way to defuse a threat. The
language originally used by President Obama to describe the
killing did not fit this preventive paradigm. Similarly, most
Americans who celebrated bin Laden’s death described it as
something that provided them with some “sense of closure.”348
346. See supra note 320 and accompanying text (discussing that Escobar
kidnapped innocent people to threaten legal authorities).
347. Obama, supra note 1.
348. See, e.g., David Jackson, Bush on Bin Laden: ‘A Sense of Closure,’ USA
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But closure has nothing to do with self-defense. Closure is what
one feels after justice has been done.
What the President tapped into, we believe, was a deeply felt
and widely shared intuition that some extrajudicial killings that
do not squarely fit within the self-defense or law-enforcement
paradigms may nevertheless be justified for both preventive and
retributive reasons. This is the same intuition underlying the
widespread agreement regarding the justifiability of Pablo
Escobar’s killing. Escobar’s killing appeared morally acceptable,
even if not in self-defense or pursuant to law-enforcement
authority, because he was dangerous and he was undoubtedly
responsible for past atrocities of an incredible scale. This is why
his death provided a sense of closure for Colombians. Escobar’s
killing—like bin Laden’s—was a way of preventing possible
future attacks, but it was also a way of doing some justice.
Accordingly, and unlike the war paradigm, this account
provides a superior explanation of why one might defend a more
tolerant approach to justifying killing—an approach that does not
require the feasibility of capture—in cases that do not share the
functional requirements generally associated with war. To the
extent that governments turn to targeted killing in this context,
there is value to considering such cases on their own terms,
rather than stretching IHL to contexts far removed from the
battlefield realities that led to IHL’s creation.
The problem with the Escobar analogy, as we have argued, is
that it was both logistically impossible and extraordinarily
dangerous for Colombians to try Escobar. Nevertheless, it
appears that it was logistically possible and not unacceptably
dangerous to try bin Laden. Therefore, although feelings of
closure and justice are understandable responses to the killing of
a dangerous individual and a mass killer, bin Laden’s
extrajudicial killing is difficult to justify under the residual
justification that explains the moral propriety of certain TK 4
killings. Retributive and preventive reasons are necessary, but
not sufficient, conditions to authorize an extrajudicial killing. In
TODAY, July 27, 2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/
2011/07/-bush-on-bin-ladena-sense-of-closure/1#.T_GxjI5kiFY (last visited Sept.
24, 2012) (describing the public reaction to the death of bin Laden) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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addition, it must be clear that trying the targeted individual is
not feasible. If bin Laden could have been tried, due process
should have been observed. Accordingly, although we have
suggested that some targeted killings may be justifiable even if
they fall outside the traditional defenses supplied by IHL and the
criminal law, the bin Laden case does not appear to fall within
this narrowly defined category.
VII. Conclusion
As we observed at the outset of this Article, the aim of our
analysis is not to find a definitive answer to the legality of the bin
Laden killing. Depending on circumstances that may never be
known, the killing may have been readily justifiable even under
the rules generally applicable to law-enforcement operations. If,
for example, the killing resulted from a reasonable belief that bin
Laden posed an imminent threat that could be defused only
through the immediate use of lethal force, then the killing was
justified as a classic case of self-defense or defense of others.
Our interest in the bin Laden case focuses instead on the
legal landscape of targeted killing and asks whether the killing
might be justified under a more permissive legal regime, one that
relaxes the restrictions generally imposed by criminal law. Public
statements of government officials have identified such a regime
in the rules applicable to killing in wartime. We have raised
questions about that account. Although there is much about
IHL’s requirements that is indeterminate and debatable, we have
argued that the best reading of IHL (assuming this law applies to
non-battlefield scenarios, such as the bin Laden killing) is
inconsistent with the view that bin Laden remained a proper
target even if capture was feasible under the circumstances.
We have further considered whether some targeted killings
might be acceptable, even if not supported by IHL, by the
conventional justification defenses generally afforded to lawenforcement officials, or by more expansive models of preemptive
self-defense. We have identified, in the case of Pablo Escobar, a
best-case scenario for a rule that does not hinge on the existence
of an armed conflict and, unlike IHL, emphasizes culpability
considerations alongside preventive considerations. If the
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Escobar case can supply such a standard, it is a narrow one: in
addition to demanding that such killings be justified by
compelling evidence, both of the target’s undeniable guilt for
grave atrocities and of compelling evidence that killing will
thwart serious future crimes, we argue that this category of
targeted killings should only be allowed when it is not feasible to
detain or try the individual because doing so would be logistically
impossible or extraordinarily dangerous.
We have also argued that the bin Laden killing, considering
the apparent feasibility of trial, does not fall within this narrow
category of cases. Nevertheless, the model we have outlined
retains explanatory power. It provides, we suspect, the best
account of the public understanding of bin Laden’s demise, one in
which his killing was an act of justice, and not merely the
neutralization of a wartime opponent. More broadly, we believe
that the criteria we have outlined identify circumstances in which
similar operations are likely to receive public legitimation even if
they fail de jure requirements.

